Public Education Investment, Economic Growth and Welfare: A Political Economy Analysis with Preference Heterogeneity
Public Education Investment, Economic Growth and Welfare: A Political Economy Analysis with Preference Heterogeneity

Summary/Abstract: This study examines the politics of public education policy and its impact on economic growth and welfare under intergenerational altruism. The study considers an endogenous growth model with altruistic overlapping generations. Due to its significant role in promoting long-term economic expansion, we consider investment in public education to be an effective tool of productive government intervention. Nonetheless, public educational investment has been the subject of political disputes owing to its inherent intergenerational redistributive implications. Backed by the tendency of democratically elected governments to maintain their political power, the preferences of some particular individuals or group of individuals become more dominant in the political process of determining the level of public investment in education. In particular, governments are more concerned with the preferences of the median voter, or the current generation at large, because they, as electors, have the ability to determine the next government. This reality leads governments to exhibit a bias toward the desires of these people. As a result, such political considerations divert the economy from its optimal path of economic growth and reduce the welfare of future generations. This effect becomes more pronounced when individuals with lower levels of altruism toward their offspring assume a more influential position in the political decision-making process over the allocation of public funds for education. Our theoretical analyses demonstrate the implications for economic growth and welfare resulting from policy decisions made by democratically elected governments with inherent biases, as opposed to decisions made by an unbiased social planner.

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