МЕЖДУ ДОБРИТЕ НАМЕРЕНИЯ И ПРАКТИЧЕСКИТЕ НЕСЪВЪРШЕНСТВА: ДЕМОКРАТИЧНИЯТ КОНТРОЛ ВЪРХУ СИСТЕМАТА ЗА НАЦИОНАЛНА СИГУРНОСТ
BETWEEN GOOD INTENTIONS AND PRACTICAL DEFICIES: DEMOCRATIC CHECKS ON NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Summary/Abstract: This article presents a critical review of constitutional foundations and draft legislation regarding the mechanisms for democratic checks on the national security system. First, the Bulgarian constitutional framework is presented which distributes the competence in the national security field between the three political branches – National Assembly, Council of Ministers and President – each of them adopting specific acts in the field. Second, the mechanisms of constitutional checks and balances and parliamentary oversight is analyzed. Third, the recently proposed (November 2012) draft legislation in the field is critically studied. A closer look to the draft laws reveals a state of good intentions and weak implementation. There are both positive and negative sides in the proposed legislation. Among the positive sides are the attempt to provide statutory ground and systematic regulation of this field by defining common principles, organization and accountability for the national security system; the regulation of procedures for democratic and parliamentary checks; clear allocation of national security agencies among the political branches of government. As negative sides are presented the lack of sufficient procedures for citizens’ monitoring on the system, the missing explanation for the reorganization of the intelligence agency changing the institutional balance between the government and the president, as well as existing gaps in the legislative systematization. The major challenge in reorganizing the national security system remains that it functions under the weak rule of law and insufficient mechanisms for checks and balances.

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