Cognitivist fallacy in theory of democracy Cover Image

Błąd kognitywistyczny w teorii demokracji
Cognitivist fallacy in theory of democracy

Author(s): Adam Chmielewski
Subject(s): Political Philosophy, Cognitive Psychology, Evaluation research
Published by: Uniwersytet Opolski
Keywords: democracy; participation; cognitive competences; cognitivist fallacy; political skill;

Summary/Abstract: The opposition between the participationist approach, which favours wide participation of the people in democratic political process, and the deliberationist model, according to which political power should be exercised by people endowed with adequate cognitive competences, remains an important theme of the present debates in the theory of democracy. The author believes that those interpretations of the deliberationist model which perceive knowledge as a primary source of legitimation of participation in the political power, are guilty of a “cognitivist fallacy”, and points out to dangers stemming from ascribing a prominent role to cognitive competences. In opposition to the “epistocratic” model, he stressed the importance of political skill in the governance of democratic systems.

  • Issue Year: 2018
  • Issue No: 6
  • Page Range: 59-75
  • Page Count: 17
  • Language: Polish