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Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

Result 1-20 of 124
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Abuse of Power: Coordinated Online Harassment of Finnish Government Ministers
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Abuse of Power: Coordinated Online Harassment of Finnish Government Ministers

Author(s): Kristina Van Sant,Rolf Fredheim,Gundars Bergmanis-Korats / Language(s): English

This report is an explorative analysis of abusive messages targeting Finnish ministers on the social media platform Twitter. The purpose of this study is to understand the scope of politically motivated abusive language on Finnish Twitter, and to determine if, and to what extent, it is perpetrated by inauthentic accounts. To this end, we developed a mixed methodology, combining AI-driven quantitative visualisations of the networks delivering messages of abuse with a qualitative analysis of the messages in order to understand the themes and triggers of abusive activity. We collected Twitter data between 12 March and 27 July 2020, a period spanning the state of emergency declared in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report is informed by the findings of three recent Finnish studies, one of which investigated the extent and effects of online hate speech against politicians while the other two studied the use of bots to influence political discourse during the 2019 Finnish parliamentary elections.

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ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili,Jānis Bērziņš,Aivar Jaeski,Mark Laity,Nerijus Maliukevičius,Aurimas Navys,Gerry Osborne,Robert Pszczel,Stephen Tatham / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy. Over the years, Russia has been drawing lessons from different Allied operations and has worked on adapting its military planning to the realities of a modern conflict. It tested these lessons in the recent August 2008 war with Georgia which marked the first use of cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation. Russia has also shown a willingness to modernize Soviet-era tools and adapt them to today’s complex information environment. Critically, it has been willing to afford informationbased activities primacy in operations, using more conventional military forces in a supporting role. Russia’s information campaign has to be analysed in the context of the strategic narrative of the Russian government, reflected in policy documents like the Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the State Security Review of 2009, and supported by legislative initiatives like the Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Compatriots Living Abroad. The notion of compatriots deserves particular attention as it allows Russia to legitimize the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of threat to their rights or physical well-being. It also leads to the explanation of the need to sustain the so-called Russian World which implies maintenance of a unified Russian-language information sphere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory of the former USSR). The Russian government’s long-developed control over the mass media has been an important factor in the effective implementation of the information campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was instrumentalized with the help of concurrent messaging. For example, the main Russian TV channels were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine from the very beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly by the Presidential Administration, including also government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is a growing, under-researched phenomenon used to support the Russian government’s narrative. This control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian government. The Russian narrative includes several dominant themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood; referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the differing interests of EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum). The report identifies that Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question. Crimea may be considered a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces, play a key role. The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The following are the general conclusions of the report: • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. The characteristics of the new form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important. • Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its own audiences – including compatriots abroad – was able to leverage historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might and collapse of the USSR. • Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term strategy. Learning from the Russian information campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection and analysis of those elements within the Russian narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s state policy documents contain such indications. • The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and should be considered carefully in the future. The security implications for countries neighbouring Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work best in areas where there are larger communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets of Russia’s information campaign and potentially may be ready to provide local support in cases of Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases demonstrate that such information campaigns, backed by military means, are easier to carry out in territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those countries which are not members of NATO and therefore not party to the Washington Treaty. • Audience Analysis is critical to operational success. Russia has demonstrated that understanding audiences and what motivates them is critical to operational success that is enduring. • There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s information campaign. Although Russia’s information campaign has been successful in influencing its audiences (the Russian population and compatriots abroad), it also bears a degree of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries and the USA. • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay. Investigating and disproving the false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the part of international organisations like NATO, the Ukrainian government, independent media, experts and even ordinary citizens. • Disinformation campaigns erode over time. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond Crimea demonstrates that disinformation campaigns erode over time as more and more factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and falsification.

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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUE – CHINA

ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUE – CHINA

Author(s): Iona Allan / Language(s): English

This is a summary of research based on a discourse analysis of official statements, speeches, and policy documents published by the Government of the Peoples Republic of China in English from 2012-2018. The narratives derived from the discourse are coded according to the national power dimensions and political values which they communicate. Sources were identified using a key word search of these publicly available resources.

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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUE – RUSSIA

ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUE – RUSSIA

Author(s): Iona Allan / Language(s): English

This is a summary of research based on a discourse analysis of official statements, speeches and policy documents published by the government of the Russian Federation in English from 2012-2017. The narratives derived from the discourse are coded according to the different national power dimensions and political values which they communicate. Sources were identified through a key word search of these publicly available resources.

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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUES – RUSSIA, CHINA AND CANADA IN THE HIGH NORTH
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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUES – RUSSIA, CHINA AND CANADA IN THE HIGH NORTH

Author(s): Iona Allan / Language(s): English

With almost 30% of the world’s remaining natural gas supply and 13% of oil located under the Northern Polar ice, the Arctic represents a place of great untapped potential.1) After the record-breaking summer ice melts of 2007 and 2012, previously impassable stretches of Arctic waters became ice-free and navigable for the first time. This allowed oil companies to send drilling ships northward and begin the first phases of oil and gas extraction. The decline of Arctic sea ice also significantly impacts the global shipping trade, opening up shorter and more lucrative trade routes between Asia and Europe, and cutting nearly 4000 nautical miles from the route in the process. 2) For Russia and Canada, countries with extensive Arctic shorelines, the receding ice has also exposed significant vulnerabilities in their collective defense and security. Unrestricted passage through their internal Arctic waters means access to Russian and Canadian territory has increased exponentially. For some governments, however, the security risks and grim long-term environmental costs of the melting Arctic ice are dwarfed by the enormity of the short-term economic opportunities on offer. Commercial interests in the Circumpolar North have never been greater. And with such high economic stakes, efforts to secure political influence and regional access to the Arctic have increased dramatically.

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Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China and NATO
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Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China and NATO

Author(s): Iona Allan,Elizabete Auniņa / Language(s): English

Over the last five years, mainstream political interest and global media attention towards the Arctic region has grown rapidly, from alarmist headlines declaring a ‘global battle for the Arctic’ and the beginning of a new ‘Cold War’ to more bleak warnings about the irreversible environmental changes taking place above the Arctic Circle. From an economic and resource perspective, the Arctic has also taken on a truly global significance in recent years. With almost 30% of the world’s undiscovered remaining natural gas supply and 13% of undiscovered oil located under the Northern Polar ice, many countries, both within and outside the region, are now looking towards the Arctic as a region of great untapped economic potential. After the record-breaking summer ice melts of 2007 and 2012, previously impassable stretches of Arctic waters became ice-free and navigable for the first time, allowing oil companies to send drilling ships northward and begin the first phases of oil and gas extraction.

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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUES: ARCTIC STATES, CHINA AND NATO
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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUES: ARCTIC STATES, CHINA AND NATO

Author(s): Iona Mackenzie Allan / Language(s): English

The following research is based on discourse analysis of official statements, speeches and policy documents published by the governments of the eight Arctic states as well as China and the NATO alliance between January 2012 and June 2019. This document provides a brief summary of the key narratives promoted by each of these 10 Arctic actors, drawing particular attention towards how they frame their identity in the Arctic (self), how they conceptualise the region (region) and how they frame relations with other Arctic stakeholders (others). The narratives identified in the discourse were coded according to the different national power dimensions and political values that they communicate. This summary is intended to give an over-view of the narrative landscape of the Arctic as indication of key national interests and areas of strategic priorities for each of these 10 Arctic actors.

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Belarus Protests: Information Control and Technological Censorship vs Connected Societies
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Belarus Protests: Information Control and Technological Censorship vs Connected Societies

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The Belarusian presidential election on 9 August 2020 was a turning point in the history of modern Belarus. Disagreeing with the apparently falsified results of the vote, protesting Belarusian citizens flooded the cities around the country. Lukashenko’s response was lightning fast and brutal. In order to conceal any information about the brutality of the law enforcement structures against peaceful protesters, Lukashenko attempted to take control of the information environment and restrict access to all information channels – especially Internet resources.

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CAMOUFLAGE FOR THE DIGITAL DOMAIN
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CAMOUFLAGE FOR THE DIGITAL DOMAIN

A FORCE PROTECTION FRAMEWORK FOR ARMED FORCES

Author(s): Sebastian Bay,Michael Bátrla,Henrik Twetman / Language(s): English

The digital environment is an increasingly important dimension of the contemporary battle space. While we have been focusing our attention on cyber-threats and systemic resilience, less attention has been paid to challenges arising from the malicious use of openly available digital information regarding military organisations. An adversary does not need significant resources or advanced cyber capabilities to pose a threat in the digital domain, when social media and digital technologies are easily accessible, providing information and infrastructure that can be exploited by anyone with access to a computer and an internet connection. For example, open-source methods can be used to geolocate military units, social media can be used to augment influence activities, and social data can be scraped for valuable intelligence.

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Clarifying Digital Terms. NATO StratCom COE Terminology Working Group
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Clarifying Digital Terms. NATO StratCom COE Terminology Working Group

Author(s): Neville Bolt,Leonie Haiden,Julian Hajduk,Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili,Gundars Bergmanis-Korats,Giorgio Bertolin,Robert Hobbs,Louise Marie Hurel,Charles Kriel,Federico Lucidi,Sanda Svetoka,Johannes Wiedemann / Language(s): English

Digital technologies and means of communication have become a central part of politics and social organisation. The role of AI, big data, and machine learning is growing, as are ethical, privacy, and security concerns which these technologies bring with them. The purpose of this glossary is to encourage the use of precise and simple language that bridges the terminological divide between policymakers, soldiers, tech companies, academics, and programmers. It is at the intersection of their respective fields, that digitalisation’s potential for positive change as well as ensuing challenges can be recognised and addressed. Sharing a common vocabulary is the first step. As digitalisation continues to transform our societies, it has also influenced the language used to describe this process. Terms related to the developments and possibilities brought on by digitalisation can seem confusing. Digital vs. cyber vs. online, AI and machine learning lack distinction in popular usage and understanding. An additional layer of complexity is added by the multiplicity of language communities that exist in this field: from programmers and computer scientists, to communicators, politicians, militaries, academics, and the general public.

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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE
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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

Author(s): Tomasz Grzyb,Shahira Fahmy,Joseph Shaheen / Language(s): English

The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as the so-called ‘Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL’, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign targeting a wide range of audiences around the world to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh first strategic success was the public address of self-styled Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaiming the existence of a renewed Islamic Caliphate. The speech drew immediate and lasting attention. The NATO StratCom COE was asked to conduct research into Daesh information strategy in order to gain a better understanding of how the Daesh information campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions concerning the situation in the Middle East. The methodology for analysing Daesh information strategy included examining the issue from a number of aspects related to strategic communications such as social psychology, communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in collaboration with experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. StratCom COE research into Daesh information strategy shows that the spectrum of the problem is much greater than only recruitment and radicalization alone. Roots • Fifteen years of insurgency, including the experience of the former soldiers of Saddam Hussein’s regime and foreign fighters from all over the world, have given the group a deep understanding of how to effectively shape the information environment. • The proclamation of ‘the Caliphate’ and the release of a propaganda publication entitled This is the Promise of Allah by the Alhayat Media Centre provide information about the future plans of the organisation and give an indication of goals of the Daesh information strategy. • One year after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s speech, many organizations have pledged allegiance or offered their support to Daesh. This support is instrumental, not only for conducting terrorist attacks, but also for amplifying the Daesh Information Strategy globally. Structure • Daesh is divided into specialised councils and departments at both the global and regional levels. A specific group within the structure is responsible for shaping the information environment by disseminating different kinds of messages, however, each department plays an important role and contributes to the effectiveness of their information strategy. Information Strategy • The name of the organization represents the core message of the group. The group wants to be described by westerners as ‘the Islamic State’, and by Middle Eastern audiences as ‘ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah’, ‘ad-Dawlah al-Caliphate’ or ‘the Caliphate’. • Daesh narratives can be divided into three main themes: Political, Religious, and Social. • The main efforts of the information strategy can be divided into four types of messages or Lines of Effort (LOE)—to Unite, Frighten, Support, and Inform. • The most effective LOE for western audiences from the point of view of the organization is the one spreading information about success of the group. The group seems to be aware of this, since informative messaging has increased significantly since the beginning of the information campaign. • Various tools, including social media propaganda, direct physical actions, and computer network operations are used to access or target potential audiences. • Twitter is used as an umbrella media platform that connects various media sources into one easily browsable and searchable information index. • Daesh uses the Twitter community structure as a defensive structure against account deletion and suspension. The structure is able to recover quickly by organizing in a number of small communities and some larger ones. Conclusions • The effectiveness has its roots in what was done at the beginning. Proclamation of the Caliphate, speech of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and strategic guidance for future plans made the group strong enough to draw attention of different countries, media and terrorist organizations. • Various audiences perceive the name of the organization differently. Since ‘perception is reality’, the choice of name used for communication purposes is crucial. • Religion underpins Middle Eastern societies. Daesh uses the radical interpretation of religion for its most effective communication. • Recruitment campaign, done internally and externally by group members has incredible meaning in overall Daesh campaign and at the same time it is the main concern of many countries around the globe. • Actions speak louder than words. Daesh knows that it is more important to take action than to merely declare intentions. In other words, Daesh is aware of the importance of avoiding ‘say-do gaps’. • Daesh is well versed in persuasion techniques that manipulate not only its adversaries, but also its own members and supporters. By paying close attention to the basic principles of influence we can identify the ways in which the group implements its strategy and the reasons its information strategies are so effective. Recommendations • It is necessary for all countries to understand Daesh’s strategic goals and how they formulate their messages. The key to success in countering Daesh at every level and building resistance to Daesh messages through the education of home audiences, is understanding how the structure works and who the potential target audiences are. • Language and terminology matter. Therefore, the words used to spread information and counter messaging should be carefully chosen. • A unified linguistic and strategic approach is needed to disrupt the networking Daesh does through various social media platforms. • It is essential to encourage Muslim authorities—recognized moderate religious and community leaders— to explain the radicalism in Daesh messages, and to rebut and refute the organization’s erroneous interpretations of Islam. • From the psychological point of view, intimidation or ridicule will not be effective counter narrative strategies. Illustrating how Daesh propaganda actually works to reach its audiences and pointing out its manipulative nature will undermine the credibility of Daesh and provide a much more productive strategy. • Testimonials from disaffected and critical foreign fighters (defectors) or supporters, can be used to reveal the true face of the terrorist group. The strategy will be much more effective if the messages come from the Middle East instead of Western countries—‘don’t come here’ is a much stronger message than ‘don’t go there’. • When communicating to the outside world, emphasis should be placed on the effectiveness of a global coalition, as well as on every loss and defeat suffered by Daesh. • It is necessary to understand the principles of influence, which draw out specific behaviours, so that countries can protect their own societies from Daesh information strategies, including recruitment and the process of radicalization. Each country, society, and audience needs to have its own specialised and comprehensive approach based on local demographics and psychographics. • Since every country has its own intelligence system, which focuses on those aspects of the situation that are closest to that country, wider information sharing about Daesh actions, techniques, and strategies will benefit everyone. Security Institutions of various countries should cooperate in order to share resources.

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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as so-called Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign at various target audiences in order to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh’s first strategic achievement, drawing considerable attention from various governments and mainstream Muslim groups, was the first public speech given by self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was devoted entirely to the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate. In order to find out how this campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions to existing challenges concerning situation on the Middle East, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) conducted research into Daesh’s information strategy. The methodology for analysing Daesh’s information strategy included a number of techniques such as social psychology, the psychology of communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in consultation with social media experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. This executive summary summarizes three reports - “Type of applied persuasive strategy and its influence on message effectiveness” (Ph. D. T. Grzyb), „Visual framing in the Islamic State” (Ph. D. Shahira Fahmy) and “Network of Terror: How Daesh Uses Adaptive Social Networks to Spread its Message” (Mr. Joseph Shaheen).

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DAESH PROPAGANDA, BEFORE AND AFTER ITS COLLAPSE. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
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DAESH PROPAGANDA, BEFORE AND AFTER ITS COLLAPSE. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Author(s): Charlie Winter / Language(s): English

This report compares two archives of official Daesh media that were compiled four years apart. It explores the nuances of the group’s worldview and tracks how external and internal situational exigencies impacted them during its formative years as a caliphate. It finds that the organisation’s media infrastructure was about one tenth as productive in mid-2019 as it was in mid-2015. The data also show that it was spending more time covering the pursuits of its global network in 2019 than in 2015. Finally, the data point towards a substantial thematic rearrangement in the organisation’s overarching propaganda narrative that manifested in it shifting its story away from millenarian utopianism and towards military denialism. In sum, the data indicate that by 2019 Daesh’s propagandists were far less productive and their aggregate product was more international and less focused on civilian issues. This shift points towards a new phase in the group’s political marketing trajectory, one focused more on survival than on expansion.

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DAESH RECRUITMENT - HOW THE GROUP ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS
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DAESH RECRUITMENT - HOW THE GROUP ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS

Author(s): Rafal Zgryziewicz / Language(s): English

To be successful, an organization must have a carefully prepared strategy communicated through the proper channels, which leads to the implementation of actions that will result in the desired end state. The process used to achieve coherence between communication and information activities, closing the gap between words, visuals, and actions is known as strategic communication. In order to be effective, strategic communication must involve both charismatic leaders and active communicators. A well thought out recruitment campaign is essential to identifying and acquiring sufficient human resources. Recruitment is a function of human resource management and refers to the process of attracting, selecting, and appointing suitable candidates for specific positions within an organisation. Just as legally operating institutions choose the best people they can find to fulfil specific needs, organized crime and terrorist organizations must recruit people to carry out their plans. The main goal is to attract the attention of potential audiences and draw them into the organisation, either regionally or globally. Daesh has been working in its strategic communications to attract the attention of people who may be willing to support Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s ideology. Daesh youth recruitment has history of its own, which is as old as the organization itself. Their approach to recruitment plays a vital role in sustaining the number of foreign terrorist fighters and many other kinds of supporters who are an essential part of the overall strategy. If we only think of Daesh recruits as foreign fighters, we are not thinking broadly enough. Of course, any recruit could potentially become a foreign or domestic fighter. A ‘foreign fighter’ is a terrorist who comes from any country other than Syria and Iraq to support Daesh in battle. However, it is important to keep in mind that the recruitment campaign is not reserved only for those who choose to fight. The campaign targets many other audiences, including those who stay in their own countries and support Daesh by executing a great many tasks necessary for the operation of the organisation. Therefore, to understand the communication strategy of the terrorists, we must first understand how Daesh wants to be supported and what motivates possible Daesh recruits. This study focuses on the ‘Support Line of Effort’ mentioned in the previous report on Daesh published by the NATO StratCom CoE. The main objectives of this report are to show who is a potentially target for Daesh recruitment, what motivates people to support Daesh, and to identify the steps recruiters take to secure new members. The Centre has been analysing Daesh products on a monthly basis. These monthly assessments have been used to calculate what percentage of the overall communication strategy is dedicated to recruitment support. They also provide some indication of what steps are being taken and what techniques Daesh has been using to staff its terrorism and intimidation projects.

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Data Brokers and Security. Risks and Vulnerabilities Related to Commercially Available Data
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Data Brokers and Security. Risks and Vulnerabilities Related to Commercially Available Data

Author(s): Henrik Twetman,Gundars Bergmanis-Korats,Nora Biteniece,Rolf Fredheim,Giorgio Bertolini,Sebastian Bay / Language(s): English

As connected individuals, part of a modern society, we generate data with everything we do. Every card-payment, website visit, browser search, social media post, and online message yields data points. Our phones register every action taken in every downloaded app; if the GPS is active they register every place we visit; and if we use biometric data monitoring they register our every heartbeat. It is virtually impossible to get an overview of the data we use and generate—data are everywhere. The overwhelming abundance of data has ushered in the ‘age of analytics’, where data informs the decisions, strategies, and activities of governments, corporations, and individuals.

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DECODING CRIMEA. PINPOINTING THE INFLUENCE STRATEGIES OF MODERN INFORMATION WARFARE
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DECODING CRIMEA. PINPOINTING THE INFLUENCE STRATEGIES OF MODERN INFORMATION WARFARE

Author(s): Alan Kelly,Christopher Paul / Language(s): English

In an era set to be defined by persistent contestation between states, of a nature which falls short of open conflict, Western democracies need to adapt. Strategies employed by adversaries are less likely to rely on the direct application of military power and increasingly on the opportunities afforded by new technologies to create effects, shrouded in complexity and ambiguity, in the information environment. Analysts, planners and policy makers facing these threats struggle with limited tools to understand their form and structure. As a response to this challenge, we propose an addition to the toolkit - a Taxonomy of Influence Strategies. This is a comprehensive system which attempts to identify, describe and classify the fundamental units of influence, referring to them as ‘plays’.

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Deepfakes – Primer and Forecast
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Deepfakes – Primer and Forecast

Author(s): Tim Hwang / Language(s): English

“Artificial intelligence”—the broad category of study exploring the creation of intelligent machines—has enjoyed a resurgence in the last decade, driven by a combination of research breakthroughs, a massive expansion in access to data, and advances in computational hardware. New developments and applications have captured the imagination of policymakers and the public at large, inspiring both hopes and fears around artificial intelligence and its future prospects. Among the many areas of concern around the technology, perhaps one of the most widely discussed has been the threat posed by “deepfakes”: synthetic audio, images, and video generated with artificial intelligence. Deepfakes are often strikingly realistic and sometimes challenging to distinguish from the genuine article. Artificial intelligence has been used to produce deepfakes depicting prominent political figures from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin saying a variety of things they never in fact said.

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Defence Strategic Communications

Defence Strategic Communications

Frequency: 2 issues / Country: Latvia

Academic journal “Defence Strategic Communications” serves as an academic forum where scholars and practitioners share knowledge and ideas about Strategic Communications specifically from the defence perspective. “Defence Strategic Communications” publishes original papers, review papers, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, case studies, empirical research, technical notes and book reviews. The Journal welcomes two kinds of contributions: full-length analytical articles ranging between 8000-10000 words, and commentaries/book review essays between 3000–5000 words. Authors are requested to submit their papers in an electronic/soft format to the following email address: linda.curika@stratcomcoe.org.

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DIGITAL HYDRA: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FALSE INFORMATION ONLINE
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DIGITAL HYDRA: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FALSE INFORMATION ONLINE

Author(s): / Language(s): English

The study investigates misinformation and disinformation on social media in the context of the rise of ‘fake news’ and the birth of the ‘post-truth’ era. Are these concerns substantiated by facts? What are the consequences of these phenomena for the information environment? Most importantly, do these phenomena pose a threat for our societal security? This study will provide actionable knowledge by answering to these questions. This introduction is an attempt to position the emergence of ‘fake news’ in a wider societal context. Particular emphasis is placed on the cognitive biases that enable information manipulation. In turn, this will lead to a discussion about the tactics employed by adversarial actors to carry out information activities.

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DISINFORMATION AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM – REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES
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DISINFORMATION AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM – REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Author(s): Rachael Lim / Language(s): English

This research project discusses disinformation in the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia (SEA). The report examines the characterisation and context of disinformation, provides an overview of its creators and its circulation, where creation refers to production and its underlying motivations and circulation refers to the different ways it is disseminated, amplified and sustained, and rounds up with a discussion on foreseeable trends. It finds that disinformation is ultimately a national security problem, and any assessment of, and response to, disinformation must be formulated with developments in other domains.

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