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(Nie)realna neutralność. Próby redefinicji białoruskiej polityki zagranicznej

Author(s): Kamil Klysinski / Language(s): Polish / Publication Year: 2018

Trwający konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński i wzrost napięcia w stosunkach Rosji z Zachodem skłonił władze białoruskie do podjęcia próby redefinicji polityki zagranicznej w kierunku zaakcentowania neutralności wobec skonfliktowanych stron. W rezultacie w okresie ostatnich kilkunastu miesięcy w retoryce Białorusi zaczęła wyraźnie dominować narracja niezaangażowania. Mińsk usiłuje odgrywać rolę neutralnego mediatora, licząc, że taka strategia będzie zabezpieczeniem przed skutkami eskalacji napięcia między Rosją a Zachodem, co postrzegane jest obecnie jako największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa państwa. Tym samym Mińsk powraca do dyskutowanej na początku lat 90. idei dążenia Białorusi do neutralności, która wciąż jest formalnie zapisana w białoruskiej konstytucji. Skuteczność nowej strategii poważnie ograniczona jest jednak pozostawaniem Mińska w ścisłym sojuszu wojskowym z Moskwą. W związku z czym Białoruś jako państwo aspirujące do neutralności nie będzie w stanie uzyskać pełnej wiarygodności na arenie międzynarodowej.

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(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy

Author(s): Kamil Klysinski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

The continuing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, together with the increased tension in relations between Russia and the West, have led the Belarusian authorities to attempt to redefine their country’s foreign policy by stressing neutrality towards the two sides in the conflict. As a result, over the last year or so Belarus has clearly adopted a non-committal stance. Minsk is trying to play the part of a neutral mediator in the hope that this will safeguard it in the event of escalation of tensions between Russia and the West, which is seen as the greatest threat to the country’s security at the present time. Thus Minsk is returning to the notion, discussed in the early 1990s, of Belarus striving for neutrality. Officially, the goal of neutrality is still stated in the Belarusian Constitution. However there are serious limitations to the effectiveness of this new strategy, due to Minsk’s close military alliance with Moscow, and therefore Belarus will not be entirely credible on the international stage as a country that wishes to remain neutral.

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A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia

Author(s): Ewa Fischer,Jadwiga Rogoza / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state.However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits.

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A breakthrough year in relations between Turkey and the European Union – an attempt to take stock

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak,Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2016

September 2016 marks the passing of one year has passed since the outbreak of the EU migration crisis which became the basis of unprecedented co-operation between Turkey and the EU. Paradoxically, although this co-operation in containing the crisis has proven surprisingly effective, the climate of Turkish-EU relations has significantly deteriorated. This situation comes in part as a result of internal tensions in Turkey (and within the EU). However, genuine changes in the power relations between Turkey and the EU have occurred and Turkey feels that issues it attaches importance to are not being appropriately addressed by the EU—the frustration this causes has been even more instrumental in the deterioration of relations. This shift in relations between Turkey and the EU also stems from Turkey’s aspirations to emancipate itself in its relations with the West; there has been an upward trend in this regard for years. The instruments the EU has so far been employing in order to put Turkey under pressure (above all the EU integration process) are losing their effectiveness, which is in stark contrast with Turkey’s emancipation and assertiveness. However, irrespective of the present and future inevitable tensions in Turkish-EU relations, Turkey’s aim is not to break off with the EU but to develop a new model of strategic relations which better serves its own interests. Despite the recent rapprochement with Russia, Ankara seems to be aware of a lack of alternatives to strategic co-operation with the EU and, more broadly, with the West.

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A captured state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation

Author(s): Kamil Calus / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2015

There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and resulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghimpu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).

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A closely watched basin. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

The construction and opening in May 2018 of the Crimean Bridge, which connects the territory of the Russian Federation with the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, has contributed to a worsening of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the Sea of Azov. Since April 2018, Russians have halted merchant ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch, which is greatly limiting the operation of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s actions are affecting Ukraine’s economy in that they make the export of goods that account for a major portion of Ukraine’s state budget revenue increasingly difficult. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, total financial losses due to shipping limitations stand at US$ 20–40 million annually.Russia’s activity in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch seems to confirm Moscow’s ambitions to make this basin a fully Russian-controlled internal area. Increased concentration of the Russian armed forces near the Crimean Bridge proves that this piece of infrastructure is of strategic importance for the Russian Federation. Access to the Sea of Azov and control of the ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch enables Russia to exert economic blackmail on Ukraine. The measures Russia has launched are of a permanent nature and are also intended to exacerbate Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. In this way, the Russian leadership is trying to influence the public mood in the southern part of the Donbas (which is controlled by Kyiv) to persuade the local residents that any further confrontation with Russia would be senseless.

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A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2016

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

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A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom’s monopoly on exports

Author(s): Szymon Kardas / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2013

An act restricting Gazprom’s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conducted for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom’s competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. The ‘liberalisation’ they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom’s competitors, they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia’s share on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road to breaking Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system.

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A game played according to Lukashenka’s rules: the political opposition in Belarus

Author(s): Tomasz Bakunowicz / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2015

The Belarusian opposition is currently experiencing its deepest crisis since Alyaksandr Lukashenka took power in 1994. Following many months of negotiations, opposition leaders failed to select a joint candidate for the presidential election scheduled for 11th October. The failure of this latest round of talks has proven that not only is the opposition unlikely to threaten Lukashenka’s rule; it will not even be able to demonstrate to society that it could provide a genuine alternative to the present government.The presidential election in 2010 was a painful landmark for the opposition. The repression that accompanied the election has largely weakened political circles opposed to the government. Against this backdrop, the traditional internal problems of the opposition have worsened, such as its incapacity to reach agreement and develop a common, coherent operational strategy, the excessive ambitions of the leaders of particular groups, the low level of political maturity, mutual distrust and frequent personal conflicts. As a result the opposition has for years been unable to gain confidence in society and reach beyond the limited number (20%) of staunch proponents of democratic transformations. Given the fact that the Belarusian opposition is fragmented and lacks one clear leader, the readiness to support individual leaders does not exceed several per cent, according to independent surveys. Lukashenka’s present political opponents rather resemble a group of dissidents, than constitute a genuine opposition to the government. The crisis and helplessness of opposition circles are more acute given Belarus’s internal situation since for the first time Alyaksandr Lukashenka will run his presidential campaign in the context of the economic crisis and a forecasted fall in GDP.

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A partial success of trade cooperation within the ‘16+1’ formula: the case of food exports to China

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2015

When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.

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A revolution in instalments. Whither Pashinyan’s Armenia now?

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

In mid-August, a hundred days passed since Nikol Pashinyan took office as Armenia’s Prime Minister, which is an office of key importance for the Armenian political system. Formerly an opposition MP, Pashinyan rose to power as a result of a bloodless revolution. He replaced Serzh Sargsyan, whose camp had ruled Armenia for the last two decades. The country’s domestic situation is stable and its economy is growing. However, the parliamentary majority and significant business assets remain in the hands of the old elite, which considerably reduces the present leadership’s room for manoeuvre.

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A ship run aground. Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwanski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2015

The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports.

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A stinking business. Environmental issues, protests and big money in the waste business in Russia

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoza / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

In recent months, Moscow oblast has seen a series of social protests against environmental problems caused by municipal waste landfills. The waste disposal sites are overloaded, lack adequate safeguards, emit toxic gases and contaminate the groundwater with harmful effluent. The situation is most severe in Moscow oblast because the capital city generates the largest volumes of waste; however, the problem itself extends beyond environmental concerns into the economic and social spheres. Waste management in Russia is marked by notorious overloading of legal waste disposal sites and the emergence of illegal waste dumps, inadequate waste disposal practices leading to air pollution and groundwater contamination which affect local residents, and bad practices by businesses with links to President Vladimir Putin which have monopolised the waste collection sector.

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A test of strength. The escalation of the crisis in Russian-American relations

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak,Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

On 6 April, the Trump administration introduced additional, more severe sanctions against Russia, covering 24 people and 14 companies: Russian oligarchs, the businesses they run, senior government officials and heads of state corporations, and (again) the Russian state arms company Rosoboroneksport. The immediate consequence of the new sanctions has been a downturn on the Russian stock market and the weakening of the rouble, as well as financial problems for the companies sanctioned, especially those belonging to the oligarch Oleg Deripaska. In the longer term the Russian oligarchs and their companies which conduct extensive activity abroad will find that the sanctions hamper their operations, and as a result, their dependence on the Kremlin will increase. On the other hand, the Kremlin will have increasing difficulty in recouping the affected oligarchs’ losses, which will lead to an increase in tensions within the elite, as well as a rise in social discontent, which will make the functioning of Putin’s regime more costly.

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China’s offer to the EU: tough negotiations or a coalition against Trump?

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Konrad Poplawski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

Donald Trump’s aggressive policy towards Beijing and the spectre of a trade war have served as a catalyst for the resumption of dialogue between China and the EU. Within a period of less than two weeks, the Chinese prime minister held three meetings with EU leaders: within the 16+1 framework, a German-Chinese intergovernmental consultation, and a China-EU summit. Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was intended to show openness to the EU’s demands to liberalise access to the Chinese market, and to neutralise allegations that China has been exploiting divisions between EU member states. Beijing hopes that improving the climate of the talks, together with making some small concessions to Brussels, and especially to Berlin, will allow it to bring the EU onto its side in its conflict with the United States at relatively little cost. This puts the EU in a dilemma. On the one hand, supporting the pressure Washington is currently putting on Beijing could lead to a real opening-up of the Chinese market, and also reduce the growing imbalance in international trade whose roots lie in China. However, this risks a collapse of economic growth in China, which would mean losses for many European companies. On the other hand, if the EU cooperated with Beijing on this matter, it could strengthen the multilateral trading system based on the WTO, and also help to defend the Iran agreement and the Paris agreement on climate change. However, if Brussels openly joins the Chinese coalition against Washington, that could cause serious divisions within the EU and in trans-Atlantic relations, and also limit Beijing’s determination to undertake domestic reforms.

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'Creeping' civil war in the North Caucasus

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

Over the last year, the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus has become further destabilised. Attacks and armed clashes happen daily, and destabilisation is spreading to an increasingly large area. The extent of violence in the region is so great that it can already be stated that a de facto civil war is taking place, the warring parties being the Islamic armed underground movement which operates under the banner of the so-called Emirate of the North Caucasus, and the secular governments of the individual republics, who are supported by local and federal branches of the Russian Federation’s Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service.

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