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The introductory part of the text is a personal reminiscence of the author about his discovery of psychoanalysis while a young scholar forced on him unwittingly by the ossified academic institution and his unexpected fascination with the discourse he had up until then considered as a naïve 19th century naturalism. Having also analysed the intellectual climate of his academic youth (late communist Poland), which was unfavourable to his interests, the author describes the misunderstandings and bad faith which fed such an approach and, against this background, shows why outside Poland, psychoanalysis has become the inalienable part of the Western intellectual mind frame. He also discusses the way French theory “saved” psychoanalysis from pseudo- Freudian commonplaces (Horney, Fromm) by showing that the founding Freudian gesture was a denaturalization of man by means of displaying the linguistic nature of supposedly naturalistic psychoanalytic notions such as the unconscious, drive or desire, and by proposing a new anthropology of sense in which language itself, as the site in which man and consciousness are constituted, is shown to be inevitably non-coincident with itself.
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In this paper I examine whether critical reasons we give for evaluative aesthetic judgments must be generalizable in order to be adequate. In the first part of the paper, I introduce central concepts relevant for the problem of aesthetic evaluation (aesthetic value, evaluative judgments, critical reasons, aesthetic experience), as well as crucial distinctions in contemporary aesthetic and meta-aesthetic debates: aesthetic cognitivism/non-cognitivism and aesthetic particularism/generalism. After I point to some relations between these concepts, in the second part of the paper, using Frank Sibleyʼs view as an example, I examine in more detail what sort of consistency characterizes critical reasons, that is, what sort of consistency distinguishes the rationality of aesthetic evaluation. This paper offers an alternative view of the weak aesthetic generalism that rests on the concept of Griceian conversational implicatures. In the end, I argue for James Shelley’s critical compatibilism, which gives considerable merit to both sides in the debate.
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Aleksandar Šušnjar Baccarini, Elvio. In a Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies, Rijeka: Sveučilište u Rijeci, 2015 Ivana Stojković Srnobrnja, Stanko. Television and New Media Aesthetics. Clio: Belgrade, 2010, p. 380
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This paper takes a closer look at three highly interrelated areas of media accountability: the “three Cs”. The Cs are defined as follows: 1. corrections policies, 2. complaints management, and 3. coverage of journalism and media by the media. Focusing on the US, the UK, Germany, Switzerland and Italy, we will try to explain the extent to which “rational economic” behavior can be found in this specific field of self-inspection, and how “predictably irrational” (Ariely 2008) media owners, media managers and journalists make decisions, and how cultural norms and behavior patterns influence media accountability and the processing of ‘unethical’ or unprofessional behavior.
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The main focus in the paper is the connection between trust and peace which makes predictability as a necessary condition of the normalcy of life possible, especially collective and communal life. Peace is defined as a specific articulation of the distribution of (political) power within a society. Peace defined in such a way requires a set of rules (norms, or laws) needed for the stability of the established social state of affairs. The main purpose of those norms, laws, is to provide predictability without which stability of such a state of affairs is not possible. The role of trust in this scheme is crucial. However, trust precedes the peace (defined as a set of accepted set of laws), and cannot be obtained by enforcing such normative instruments as laws. Trust is so a component of freedom, the same which contains distrust as its possible component. In this sense peace should be taken as the power of control, first the control over ourselves, the power which makes status and existence of trust possible and feasible.
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The main focus in the paper is the connection between trust and peace which makes predictability as a necessary condition of the normalcy of life possible, especially collective and communal life. Peace is defined as a specific articulation of the distribution of (political) power within a society. Peace defined in such a way requires a set of rules (norms, or laws) needed for the stability of the established social state of affairs. The main purpose of those norms, laws, is to provide predictability without which stability of such a state of affairs is not possible. The role of trust in this scheme is crucial. However, trust precedes the peace (defined as a set of accepted set of laws), and cannot be obtained by enforcing such normative instruments as laws. Trust is so a component of freedom, the same which contains distrust as its possible component. In this sense peace should be taken as the power of control, first the control over ourselves, the power which makes status and existence of trust possible and feasible.
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The article argues that so called self-rated health, the best known predictor of mortality, is a research artefact. In lay theories of health that are strongly influenced by biomedicine, health and death are closely related: the worse one’s health, the shorter one’s life. Therefore, self-rated health implicitly contains one’s estimate of how long one will live. However, it is well known that self-rated life expectancy can be obtained just as well via a direct question. In social – ethnic – groups whose lay theories of health are affected by biomedicine to a limited extent or not at all, the relationship between health and death may be much looser or qualitatively different. In these groups, self-rated health does not correlate with mortality or the correlation is weak. At the same time, upon direct questioning, these people should be just as good in estimating one’s life expectancy as anybody else. For these reasons, so called self-rated health is a redundant concept; an artefact that has been created via unacknowledged biomedicalization of health research. The argument draws on findings of comparative social science (anthropology), STS (Social and Technology Studies) and selected quantitative research.
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