Author(s): Róbert Hermann / Language(s): Hungarian
Issue: 1/2009
Using the literature, published sources and the archival findings of the author, the paper surveys the relationship of prime minister Lajos Batthyány and Artúr Görgei the future commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army. Even though they both came from ancient noble families, Batthyány’s family was one of the wealthiest and most influential aristo-cratic families, while that of Görgei had, by this time, descended into the lower ranks of the gentry. In their youth, both joined the army: Batthyány did so to flee from his mother’s ju-risdiction, while Görgei planned to lay the foundation of his future existence. Their fates met in the summer of 1848, when Görgei joined the home defense army. They first met each other in July 1848. The agile Honvéd captain soon attracted Batthyány’s attention, who entrusted him with many tasks that required self-dependence. In August 1848, Görgei became one of those officers who devised the plans for the volunteer mobile national guards, and was appointed by Batthyány the commander of the volunteer mobile national guards in the Szolnok district. During September, they were in contact with each other, in writing, practically on a daily basis, and also met in person during Görgei’s frequent visits to Pest. At the end of September, Batthyány ordered Görgei to the capital to appoint him on September 24 the commander of the Csepel island. Görgei did an excellent job in his new position. On October 2, prime minister Batthyány resigned while Görgei was pro-moted colonel. The next time they met, which was to be their last meeting, was in the mid-dle of October 1848 in the Lajta camp, where Batthyány, as a private individual, protested against the crossing of the Austrian border. On his way to the camp of Windisch-Grätz as a member of the parliamentary delegation, he passed through Görgei’s headquarters on January 1, 1849. The parliamentary peace delegation was one of the reasons that explain the crisis among the staff of officers in Görgei’s Upper Danube army, and led to Görgei’s Vác Proclamation. After the arrest of the former prime minister, Görgei was believed to be considering some sort of rescue operation in May and June 1849, and even discussed his plans with Batthyány’s wife. After the victory of the intervention forces, the Austrian gov-ernment was unable to take revenge on either Kossuth, who had taken over Batthyány’s re-sponsibilities, or Görgei, who had gained a victory with his army in the spring of 1849. As a result, Batthyány was made the number one target even though his conviction was illegal even according to the inner logic of the Austrian retaliation.
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