Vlček, Vojtěch: Totalitám navzdory Karmelitánské nakladatelství, Kostelní Vydří 2011, 516 stran
Review of: Vlček Vojtěch "Totalitám navzdory" Karmelitánské nakladatelství, Kostelní Vydří 2011, 516 pages by: Petr Mallota
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Review of: Vlček Vojtěch "Totalitám navzdory" Karmelitánské nakladatelství, Kostelní Vydří 2011, 516 pages by: Petr Mallota
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Review of: Cenckiewicz Sławomir "Długie ramię Moskwy. Wywiad wojskovy Polski Ludowej 1943–1991 (wprowadzenie do syntezy)" Zysk i S-ka Publishing House, Poznań 2011, 534 pages by: Petr Blažek
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Review of: Williamson David G. "Zrazené Polsko. Nacistická a sovětská invaze v roce 1939" JOTA, Brno 2010, 268 pages by: Ladislav Kudrna
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April of last year marked the sixtieth anniversary of Operation K, the so-called Czech St. Bartholomew’s Night, when on the order of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party armed units of the State Security police (StB), the National Security Corps and the People’s Militia attacked holy male orders in Czechoslovakia on the night of 13-14 April 1950 and deported the friars to concentration camps. The second stages of Operation K followed fourteen days later, when the monasteries were definitively dissolved (until the collapse of the communist regime in 1989). Some monks were interned in camps with a stricter regime. The younger monks had to go to forced labour camps. In the course of the 1950s, more than 350 of them were convicted in trumped-up trials. Most communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe adopted a similar approach to monks even though each had its own specific characteristics. In the text, we present a comparison of the fate of monks in Czechoslovakia whilst taking account of differences in the Czech lands and in Slovakia, Hungary and Poland.
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Review of: Pehr Michal "Zápas o nové Československo 1939–1946. Válečné představy a poválečná realita" "Lidové noviny" Publishing House, Prague 2011, 237 pages by: Petr Svoboda
More...Znali čeští komunisté a diplomacie Spojených států již v zimě roku 1939 záměry Sovětského svazu?
In 1939, five Czech communists travelled from Prague to Moscow. The reason for their journey was the fact that Moscow had ceased criticizing the actions of Nazi Germany in its radio broadcasts. In October of the same year, they finally managed to get an audience with Alexander Mihailovich Alexandrov, who was then chief of the Central European Division of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. These Czech “rebels” were unpleasantly surprised to learn of a non-aggression pact. Alexandrov gave them a comprehensive explanation of Stalin’s policy. It was important that the conclusion of the pact had caused the War. An encircled Germany would never have gone to war. Moscow’s objective was for the confl ict to last as long as possible and for it to be restricted to three combatants – Great Britain, France and Germany. After the collapse of the Third Reich, the Red Army would march into Europe, whose inhabitants would accept any regime that followed the end of hostilities. Whereas Lenin had succeeded in creating communism, Stalin would lead Europe into a global revolution. Besides this, the pact enabled the Soviet Union to gain Poland’s extensive eastern territories with minimal effort. Moreover, nothing could now prevent it from implementing the planned Bolshevization of the Baltic States. At the same time, in obtaining a base by the Baltic Sea, it succeeded in gaining economic and military control of that region. Hitler had put himself at the mercy of the Soviet Union. He was completely dependent economically on Moscow. Czech communists should remain calm, because the situation had never been as favourable to Soviet interests. As regards comrades who had been arrested in the Protectorate, Alexandrov told them that there would be no revolution without sacrifices. Upon returning to the occupied Czech lands, the five Czech communists made a report of their stay in Moscow. On 17 November 1989, this fell into the hands of the American Consul General in Prague, Irving Nelson Linnel, who subsequently sent it to his head office in Washington. This was where it was found after 40 years in the National Archives and Records Administration by Professor Kalvoda and Professor Lukeš, who discovered the document independently of each other. Thanks to the Israeli researcher Shaulim, a copy also eventually found its way to me. While Professor Lukeš does not doubt the authenticity of the document, some Czech historians view it with scepticism. At the beginning of the 1990s, Professor Valenta told Professor Lukeš the names of all fi ve communist “rebels”. Unfortunately, he made no record of these names, because it did not strike him as important at the time. After an intensive study of archive materials, I managed to discover a record written in Russian in the National Archives in Prague with the names of five Czech communists who attended an unspecified congress in Moscow in 1939. But are these the same five Czech communists referred to above? It is evident that until the names of these delegates are discovered and confirmed, the report will continue to be the subject of speculation. Unfortunately, without access to the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, there is effectively no chance of any progress on this issue.
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This study looks at the legal contexts of the communist putsch in Czechoslovakia in 1948. The roots of the events that took place in February 1948 can be found not only in the years preceding that time, but also during a period that is far older. First, the author seeks an answer to the question as to why a totalitarian Czechoslovak Communist Party government was not established as early as 1945. He finds an answer in the international context of that era, when Czechoslovakia acted as a kind of “shop window” for the Soviet Bloc, and had the task of proving the possibility of democratic parties being able to co-exist with the communists. The author considers the proclaimed “Czechoslovak road to socialism” to be nothing more than a propagandistic proposition, as demonstrated by facts proving the Czechoslovak communists’ complete lack of independence and their unconditional submission to Stalin’s USSR. Moreover, representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party themselves clearly declared that there was no other route to socialism besides the Soviet one. The next part of the text contains an analysis of the legal situation in the period 1945-1948. Attention is devoted to the political contexts ensuing from the newly established system of the National Front and the international context, where the incorporation of the Czechoslovak Republic into the Soviet Bloc can be deduced. The focus of the legal analysis in the given time frame deals with the issue of Czechoslovak Germans and Hungarians, as well as the principle of their collective guilt for the Nazi reign of terror, which was enshrined in legal regulations, and the transfer of the burden of proof to defendants, which is identified (in the same way as it has been by other authors) as an antecedent to the repression of the regime that emerged after February 1948. As an issue that is legally very contentious, the study also describes the statutory definition and activity of Special People’s Courts, which prosecuted the perpetrators of Nazi crimes and their accomplices. The impact of nationalisation is also not overlooked, and emphasis is placed on the difference between this policy and that which existed under communism, consisting of the fact that it was considered necessary to provide compensation to the people who were affected. The so-called Lex Schwarzenberg law went even further. This once-off piece of legislation illustrates the deliberations of the state’s political representatives on the irreversible nature of the route to socialism. The author also points out the importance of state security, where the activity of communists aimed at seizing unlimited power in the country is most vividly apparent. Using several specific examples, the paper demonstrates the breach of legal precepts by representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the security services and their expedient approach to the law. It also refers to illegal methods and preparations used by the communists for a decisive battle. The author outlines an entire range of facts proving that it is impossible to describe the years 1945-1948 as a period of government by rule of law and democratic principles. Nonetheless, as opposed to the era after February 1948, this period did allow for the possibility of invoking one’s rights and exercising constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, albeit with great difficulty. As regards the course of events in February 1948, the author defines the difference between legality and legitimacy, whilst also describing the illegal practices of the communists before the resignation of ministers from democratic parties. He emphasises the completely legal approach of the democrats, which clashed with the expedient attitude of the communists who did not view the law as a framework that defined the limits of their actions, but as an instrument that was specially constructed to benefit and serve the Communist Party. He reaches the conclusion that the communist putsch was inevitable and describes its development in terms of constitutional law. He identifies the resignation of not 12, but 14, members of the government as a crucial fact. When this occurred on 25 February 1948, the government became inquorate and therefore non-existent from a constitutional standpoint. The author also draws attention to the tactical and propagandistic considerations that led the communists to claim the resignation of only 12 ministers, thereby invoking the argument that the situation simply involved replenishing and reconstructing the government. The reasons for this approach can be found in the international context, where the communist putsch was being discussed in the UN and had attracted the attention of the entire world. Consequently, Czechoslovak communists tried to simulate the legality of their seizure of power. The reality, however, was utterly different, and the fact that there were 14 resignations overturns the idea that the course of events in February 1948 was constitutional in formal terms, which is a view that has also been supported up to now by some of the specialist literature on the subject. The author describes possible alternatives that would have been in line with the constitution and points out that the government of the “revived National Front” cannot be viewed as being constitutional, despite the fact that President Edvard Beneš accepted the resignation of the 14 ministers under unacceptable pressure from the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and appointed a new government under Klement Gottwald, which had apparently only been replenished and reconstructed. The study does not omit the actual implementation of the putsch, in which the illegitimacy of the communists’ actions is patently obvious. The illegal practices of the security services, the arrest of well known democrats without any legal basis, the unconstitutional methods of illegal “action committees” and the purges they carried out at all levels of the state apparatus, in political parties and factories, as well as the similar manner in which ministers were thrown out of their offices, before their resignations had been accepted, by usurpers from the ranks of the action committees (even though the ministers had a mandate from voters in free elections) demonstrate the Czechoslovak Communist Party’s complete contempt for the constitution, laws and democratic rules. A typically putschist phenomenon comprised raids on the secretariats of other parties by armed communists and the participation of illegal Party units/people’s militias in the seizure of power. Likewise, the nomination of Communist Party agents in other parties for government was completely at variance with democratic principles. Moreover, the structure of the new government did not respect the results of the elections in 1946. Slovak bodies were also illegitimately taken over, which tramp led on the will of voters who had ensured an overwhelming victory for democratic parties in 1946. Furthermore, the study draws attention to the repressive nature of the new authority, which clamped down on demonstrating students and subsequently terrorised entire swathes of Czechoslovakia’s population with mass purges, a class concept of law and a dictatorship of the proletariat (the Czechoslovak Communist Party). Consequently, the author provides a basis for the thesis that the events of February 1948 comprised an anti-constitutional putsch, which was not rooted in the will of the citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, as expressed in free elections. This therefore results in the conclusion that the regime of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was illegal and illegitimate right from the very start of its existence, both in accordance with the standards of the time and recognised legal precepts.
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Review of: Pejčoch Ivo – Plachý Jiří a kolektiv "Okupace, kolaborace, retribuce" PIC MO, Prague 2010, 327 pages by: Jan Šach
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A report from the conference named From Freedom to non-freedom 1945-1956.
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This study deals with the formation and activities of political parties and groups of Czech émigrés in the West after the communist putsch in February 1948. The author defends the opinion that, in view of the limited options and “instruments” available in exile, it is more appropriate to use the term “political activism” to describe the given issue rather than “politics”. He points to the fact that political activism became one of the pivotal activities of the wider émigré movement in the period described which comprised at least 60,000 refugees who had escaped the communist regime. The period 1948 to 1956 is demarcated at the outset by the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and its ending is circumscribed by the Soviet military invasion of Hungary and the suppression of the uprising in that country. The author describes these years as the first of a total of four phases that divide the history of the émigré movement into periods of time. Each of these phases is characterised by the consequences of important international watershed events – after the Soviet aggression (and Western passivity) in Hungary in 1956, he cites the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Helsinki Conference in 1975 as further breaking points. The first of these four periods (which is broadly documented in the study) was typified by a surge in political activism, i.e. by the restoration of political parties and the emergence of distinctive political groupings. Their members and supporters lived in many states, which they had gradually emigrated to from refugee camps, but the main centre of political efforts and actions was the United States. The reason behind the intensive political activism and the fact that this activism was a central theme “of the age” was the belief of an absolute majority of refugees that they would return to their homeland in the foreseeable future when communist supremacy would be replaced by a more liberal political system. Anticipated pressure from the liberal and democratic West, or a possible conflict waged by the West (and led by the United States) against the totalitarian Soviet Union, and the subsequent liberalisation of the Bolshevised satellite states in Central and South-Eastern Europe, were meant to contribute to this. Nevertheless, there was a marked decline in political activism after eight years of exile, which culminated in the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the concurrent passivity of the United States and the entire Western community. This decline was caused by disillusionment at the failure to fulfil the expectations mentioned and the need for people to primarily look after their own welfare during what now looked like a long period of exile. The author describes the first émigré era as a period of irreconcilable differences between two political camps (trends) with competing programmes, which were made up of individual parties and groups. Those who stood against Czech and Slovak representatives and advocates of the post-War National Front (national socialists, social democrats, members of the People’s Party, Slovak democrats and the non-partisan Council of Free Czechoslovakia) comprised Czechs who rejected the Košice Government Programme and the political regime of the so-called “Third Republic” (the Czech National Committee, the Christian Democratic Movement and the Union of Czech Democratic Federalists) and Slovaks who also demanded the restoration of Slovak independence in addition to their rejection of the Košice programme. The basic points at issue were attitudes to the post-War regime (a ban on centrist and right-wing political parties, retributive justice, the nationalisation of assets, and the resettlement of Sudeten Germans versus liberal democratic principles), attitudes to the national rights of Slovaks (an indivisible state union in Czechoslovakia versus the right of Slovaks to self-determination), and attitudes to President Edvard Beneš (a democrat and statesman of outstanding merit versus an irresponsible autocrat and the main culprit behind the tragedy of Czechoslovakia). Another subject that was soon added to this list was the West’s approach to the Cold War (passive acceptance of the Western strategy to weaken Soviet communism with nationalist “Titoist” communism versus active, implacable anti-communism). In this study, the author illustrates the irreconcilable émigré conflict between the exponents of the political trends that have been outlined. (In doing so, he only mentions the Slovak issue in peripheral terms). He also presents in detail individuals and groups belonging to the “anti-Košice” bloc. As he states in his conclusion, he ended up giving preference to this camp partly as a result of the fact that they have been marginalised and excluded by the work of historians up to now, and partly because the erstwhile ideas and political opinions of this faction’s exponents can serve as an inspiration for both contemporary historiography and politics.
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Review of: Kaplan Karel, Paleček Pavel "Komunistický režim a politické procesy v Československu." Barrister & Principal, Brno 2008, 2. edition, 256 pages by: Petr Svoboda
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Review of: Kaplan Karel "Poúnorový exil 1948–49." Dialog, Liberec 2007, 200 pages by: Petr Svoboda
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Review of: Vaněk Miroslav (ed.): "Mocní? A bezmocní? Politické elity a disent v období tzv. normalizace. Interpretační studie životopisných interview." Prostor ve spolupráci s Ústavem pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, Prague 2006, 412 pages by: Petr Svoboda
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Review of: Přidal Jan "Konec selského stavu na Olomoucku. Čas násilí – doba temna." Společnost pro minulost venkova, Olomouc, 2009, 148 pages by: Anna Macourková
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Review of:Blažek, Petr – Kubálek, Michal (eds.): "Kolektivizace venkova v Československu 1948–1960 a středoevropské souvislosti" Dokořán, Prague 2008, 330 pages by: Anna Macourková
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The article presents the discussion with the book by Antoni J. Wręga "PRL w Dallas. Rzecz o zacieraniu śladów zamachu na prezydenta Kennedy’ego" which brings some new information and interesting (though sometimes risky) hypotheses on the circumstances of the assassination and possible conspiracy. It focuses around the role of George de Mohrenschildt in the affair, covering tracks, as well as clear clues of his ties with the intelligence of the communist Poland (SB) and possibly the Soviet Union.
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The penalty of corrective labor was introduced into Polish system of jurisdiction in petty offences cases in 1951 and it replaced the penalty of arrest. The essence of this penalty consisted in the duty to work in appointed place and part of salary was confiscated. The idea was that this penalty will have educational influence on the sentenced person and it will bring him up to live in the socialist society. However, the practice was different. In fact the state was only confiscating a part of salary, so this punishment was rather a kind of a fine in instalments. The penalty was inefficient especially in hooligan nature cases, and it was gradually replaced by the penalty of arrest. In December 1958 the correctional labor penalty was abolished and the boards judging petty offences (not courts) were empowered to decree the punishment of arrest. It was a retreat from the earlier concepts of the educational role of this jurisdiction. The modified version of this penalty exists till now in the petty offences’ code from 1971. It is known as „penalty of restricted liberty”. This penalty can be replaced now by penalty either of arrest or fine.
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The compulsory delivery of agriculture products in Poland was introduced in 1951. The Communist government wanted to control agriculture production in this way. The shortages of food in towns caused big political problems and the communists tried to control farmers by the administrative and penal repression. In 1952 boards judging petty offences were established and they punished farmers by fines. They were high, especially for richer farmers “kulaks”, but for all groups of farmers they were severe. The efficiency of these fines was not very high, because farmers did not want to pay. Then the authorities introduced an arrest as a substitutive penalty, if the farmer didn’t pay the fine. This penalty gave good results – farmers started fulfilling the deliveries, but the system was very repressive. In 1955, when first syndromes of post-Stalin thaw started, the system became less repressive. In 1956 the range of the compulsory delivery was reduced and economic measures were applied to those, who didn’t fulfill the duty. They were abolished in 1971.
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The primary intention of the paper is to show Communism organization, expansion and operation followed by Serbian Church magazines between 1920 and 1940 in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Yugoslavia. The author, will by analyzing all available and the relevant church newspapers from that period show how the Serbian Church magazines reacted to Communism. Special attention will be paid to the organization, expansion and (secret) action of the Communists since the founding of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPY) and the Young Communist League of Yugoslavia (SKOJ) until the beginning of World War II. Communism, at the time, was a new political philosophy which was developed as a child of socialism versus capitalism. Communism slowly came to the scene of the new state which was founded after World War I. Communism using the still young, economically weaken, and we can say insufficiently organized, multinational and multi-religious Kingdom, slowly, with a great discipline of his supporters and good organization expanded its field of action. In this paper, we will talk about it, whether, and how, Serbian church magazine recognized organization and expansion of the new political thinking and how it commented on itture.
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Review of: Adam Lityński "Prawo Rosji i ZSRR 1917–1991, czyli historia wszechzwiązkowego komunistycznego prawa (bolszewików). Krótki kurs"; 2nd edition, Publishing C.H. Beck 2012, 402 pages; by: Andrzej Witkowski
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