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This publication provides an overview of the hidden economy dynamics in Bulgaria. The authors make an analysis of the effects of the crisis on the labor market and undeclared work based on the results from the Hidden Economy Monitoring System. After examining the European and the Bulgarian experience of the last five years, they make recommendations to the improvement of the public policies for reducing the hidden economy. The authors also justify the necessity of combining administrative control, socio-economic measures and structural reforms in the control administrations and the law enforcement agencies.
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Systemy międzynarodowej współpracy rozwojowej poszczególnych państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej w większości przypadków istnieją dopiero od dekady. Poszczególne kraje V4 starają się budować swoją pozycję poprzez stopniowe zwiększanie wartości dwustronnej oficjalnej pomocy rozwojowej. Posiadane przez nie zasoby są jednak dość ograniczone i zostały dodatkowo zredukowane wskutek kryzysu finansowego i gospodarczego. Mimo to, od 2009 r. do krajów Partnerstwa Wschodniego trafia coraz większa część łącznej wartości ODA całej Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. // Ponieważ systemy pomocowe poszczególnych krajów dopiero się rozwijają, a same kraje skupiają się na budowie własnej marki, jest mało prawdopodobne, by w najbliższej przyszłości były one zainteresowane stworzeniem wspólnego funduszu rozwojowego, czy to dla obszaru PW, czy też mającego ogólny charakter. Dlatego zamiast myśleć o tworzeniu nowych instytucji należałoby rozważyć zracjonalizowanie obecnej współpracy i lepsze wykorzystanie już teraz zaangażowanych zasobów.
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The government’s extensive programme for stimulating the economy has enabled China to maintain high economic growth after the global financial crisis in 2008. However, this success has come at the price of a number of negative economic phenomena and the consequences they have had are the major challenge for the government today. The vast programme of investments in infrastructure, construction and fixed assets, which has been the main source of economic growth over the past few years, has caused a rapid increase in China’s debt from 158% of GDP in 2007 to 282% in 2014. Along with the local governments in charge of implementing the programme, the Chinese sector of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been heavily burdened by the stimulation policy. The sector’s profitability has fallen, its indebtedness has increased and management problems have been revealed.
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Work on this paper was completed in January 2010. One of the key questions in our research regarding the new gas export pipeline linking Russia with EU concerns the role which Nord Stream will play in Gazprom’s strategy for Europe, considering the changing market conditions and the losses the company sustained in 2009. We proposed the thesis that Gazprom will try to use all available measures, including Nord Stream, to improve the price competitiveness of Russian gas and also to guarantee sales of this fossil fuel. We also assumed that the company may become ready at some point to gradually adjust to the conditions existing on an increasingly liberalised EU gas market. In February 2010, Gazprom decided to make a move unprecedented in its previous policy, which confirms the theses presented in this paper. The Russian company competing for its share in the European gas market, decided to temporarily adopt (as it claims) more flexible provisions on longterm contracts with its key European partners (ENI from Italy, E.ON from Ger ma ny, GdF from France) and Botas from Turkey. The main change is the link age of the price of part (10–15%) of the gas sold by Gazprom to gas prices on exchanges.
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Indie są dziś jednym ze wschodzących mocarstw, które będą wywierały rosnący wpływ na globalną gospodarkę i politykę. To siódmy największy kraj na świecie pod względem terytorium i drugi pod względem liczby mieszkańców (ponad 1,3 mld). To też siódma gospodarka w wartościach bezwzględnych i trzecia pod względem parytetu siły nabywczej (purchasing power parity, PPP). Z tempem wzrostu PKB powyżej 7% w 2016 r., rozwijała się najszybciej wśród państw G20, szybciej niż Chiny. To też potęga militarna, kraj mający broń jądrową, drugą największą armię i będący głównym na świecie importerem uzbrojenia. To w końcu największa ludnościowo demokracja świata.
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The EU’s heavy reliance on imports of energy resources leaves it vulnerable to external suppliers and comes at an economic and political cost. Among the EU’s energy imports its governance vulnerability is especially visible in the gas sector. This is because pipeline infrastructure, longterm contracts, price formulas and an underdeveloped European market weaken the EU’s hand in bargaining with its major gas suppliers, principally Russia and Norway. Norwegian and Russian gas constitutes 80% of all gas imports to the EU. The European Union does have one considerable lever in dealing with Norway and Russia: it is a very attractive market for both countries. This gives the EU some scope to set the rules of the game in terms of gas. The EU assumes the establishment of a fully-fledged European internal market, as well as implementing competition law and exporting market regulations beyond its borders in a bid to reduce prices and depoliticise gas imports, but that raises a question about whether the EU is neglecting other tools available to the EU, such as brute political or financial levers. Indeed the lack of political cohesion among the Member States remains the EU’s Achilles’ heel and its financial capacity is insufficient to force the market to integrate.
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Polska, podobnie jak inne państwa Unii Europejskiej i ta część społeczności międzynarodowej, która w ostatnich latach zmniejszyła intensywność kontaktów z Iranem z powodu jego programu atomowego, poszukuje dziś możliwości odbudowania stosunków. Obie strony – irańska i europejska – przejawiają zainteresowanie maksymalnym ich polepszeniem w możliwie najkrótszym czasie, póki istnieje w Europie i USA konsensus, że z Iranem należy rozmawiać. Szybkość powrotu Iranu do grona akceptowanych partnerów międzynarodowych, przede wszystkim jako atrakcyjnego partnera handlowego, świadczy o naturalnej predyspozycji globalnego systemu gospodarczego do wykorzystywania pojawiających się nisz. Zapowiada także trudności z utrzymaniem tak istotnego podmiotu poza systemem ekonomiczno-politycznym w erze zglobalizowanych stosunków międzynarodowych.
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More than any other Member State, Poland feels the dangers of the separation of the EU into insiders and outsiders. The country’s economic, political and security standing is bound up with its further integration into a strong European Union, but the intrusive reforms being carried out to restore the Eurozone risk excluding not just it and other non-euro members but the arc of states to its east. Poland has thus fallen victim to 2004’s “incomplete enlargement” of the bloc. So far, Poland has enjoyed sympathy and support from euro members such as Germany, and as a “pre-in” to the currency has been entitled to co-define the development of Eurozone governance. However, its EU partners appear increasingly intolerant of its demands for inclusion. When it ratified its EU accession treaty, they argue, Poland undertook to join the common currency. If it wants to ensure that it is included in decision-making, Warsaw simply needs to re-commit with a firm roadmap.
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Despite delays, a lack of short-term results, as well as turbulent domestic political agendas, the North–South Gas Corridor (NSGC or NSI) remains a priority for all of the Central European states. There are significant differences among them in terms of the level of market liberalisation, progress in building physical infrastructure, and with short-term priorities; however, first and foremost in common is a deep need to diversify both gas supply routes and suppliers. The goal is to achieve this using the same tools in each country—the development of new infrastructure, especially new interconnectors and underground gas storage facilities, contractual and trade arrangements (the introduction of physical and virtual reverse flows), market liberalisation, and the promotion of competition, spot markers and contracts with alternative gas suppliers. The V4 governments and regulators should be expected to continue coordination of efforts amongst themselves on a common regulatory framework for unified wholesaler trading zones, in parallel with the EU Single Market process (an integrated entry/exit network, a single virtual trading point, mergers of trading zones, etc.). In the long run, regional market liquidity might be increased through the establishment of a common gas trading hub, possibly at the future LNG terminal in Świnoujście, Poland. This could strengthen the hand of all of the purchasing countries from the region vis-á-vis their traditional suppliers, namely Russia and Norway.
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Even though the EU-Georgia DCFTA has not yet had any substantial impact on trade and Georgia’s exports to the EU, it undoubtedly changed in a positive way Georgia’s prospective attractiveness as a trade and investment hub. After the entry into force of the EU-Georgia DCFTA in 2014, Georgia concluded further FTAs with EFTA, China and Hong Kong. The DCFTA increased Georgia’s potential attractiveness as a market where in principle its FTA partners can invest, produce and then export to the EU, taking advantage of tariff free trade as well as of comparatively attractive business environment in the country. The real benefits of these new FTAs in terms of trade and growth remain still to be seen, but Georgia continues to pursue actively its liberal trade policies and conclude more FTAs with the aim to broaden its market. The next big market after China is India, and exploratory talks are also envisaged with the CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) region and possibly Israel as well.
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Greece, the Baltic states and Iceland are examples of small countries whose experience is often adduced to argue for or against austerity. Paul Krugman, for example, argues that the fact that Latvian GDP is still more than 10% below its pre-crisis peak shows that the “austerity cum wage depression” approach does not work and that, Iceland, which was not subject to Brussels austerity and devalued its currency, seems to be much better off. Others have pointed out that Estonia avoided a financial crisis because it pursued a strict austerity policy in the wake of the crisis and is now growing vigorously again, whereas Greece, which delayed its fiscal adjustment for too long, experienced a deep crisis and is still mired in recession.
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Millennium Development Goal 8 (MDG 8) consists of six targets. The targets are intended to enhance the situation in several fields: (target 1) develop the financial and trade systems; (target 2) upgrade transportation and customs infrastructure; (target 3) monitor external debt; (target 4) reduce youth unemployment; (target 5) ensure access to essential medicines; (target 6) build an information society. // The particularities of MDG 8 derive from the diversity of issues included in this goal. Most targets have an economic essence (except the target aimed at access to medicines), nevertheless, it is difficult to ensure a continuity or connection among the issues subject to analysis. Such a variety of issues generated much confusion among the respondents. Thus, several business entities tend to under-estimate their contribution to MDG 8. Or, such respondents consider they have a direct impact solely on one target. In the same time, the in-depth interview showed that the activity of the company/SCO is to a certain extent related to two or even three targets of MDG 8. // This report makes the analysis of the role and contribution of civil society organizations and private sector to achieving the targets of Millennium Development Goal 8 „Create sustainable partnerships for development” (MDG 8). The major goal of the survey is to point out the contribution and the role of civil society organizations and private sector in achieving MDG 8.
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This collection of papers includes papers presented at the scientific conference 45 YEARS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT UNWE: SUCCESSION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PROCESSES IN EUROPE, organized by the Department of International Relations at UNWE and held in Sofia on October 29, 2021. More than eighty scholars and researchers from different universities and research institutions participated in the scientific forum. The present volume includes the texts of those of the conference participants who sent their presentations in written form. The volume is structured in four parts. The first one contains the keynote speeches delivered at the conference. The second one includes research papers that address the following question: After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan - are the contours of the new global order clearer? The third part is focused on European collisions, centrifugal forces and prospects for development. The papers in the fourth part deals with problems and projects in Southest Europe and the role of Bulgaria.
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Prezentowane w tej książce teksty powstawały od końca 2020 do początku 2023 roku, w zasadzie w sposób spontaniczny, jako reakcja na kolejne wydarzenia, których natura była taka, że nie dawało się ich przewidzieć. Nie było więc jakiegoś szczególnego zamysłu, planu, który poprzedzałby podejmowanie kolejnych zagadnień stanowiących przedmiot uwagi w tej publikacji. Najpierw były to teksty tworzone w odpowiedzi na wyłaniające się kolejne aspekty pandemii COVID-19, potem pojawiły się analizy różnych aspektów wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej, aż wreszcie zrodziła się refleksja bardziej ogólna, którą dobrze ujmuje hasło „przesilenie cywilizacyjne”. To określenie ma oznaczać specyficzny moment w rozwoju cywilizacji, swego rodzaju rozdroże, gdzie spotykają się różne odmiany symbolicznych łabędzi – te czarne, których nie potrafiliśmy w większości przewidzieć (pandemia, wojna), ale też te białe i szare, które mogą symbolizować kumulujące się w rozwoju cywilizacji problemy, takie jak kwestie klimatyczne, problemy nierówności ekonomicznych czy wyzwania demograficzne.
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İktisat bilimi kıtlık ile mücadele amacından dolayı bir takım tercih ve seçimlerde bulunarak, bireysel ve toplumsal refahın nasıl artırılabileceğini araştıran bir çalışma alanına sahiptir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, öncelikle “ne üretileceği”, “nasıl üretileceği” ve “kime üretileceği” sorularına doğru yanıtlar vermek gerekecektir. İşte iktisat biliminde bu sorulara cevap arayan ekonomik yapılara, iktisadi sistemler denir. Bir anlamda iktisadi sistemler ekonomik yaşamda, oyunun kuralının nasıl belirlendiğini ortaya koyan yapılardır. Genel olarak iktisadi sistemler iki zıt piyasa ekonomisi ve kumanda ekonomisi arasında yer alırlar. Buradaki temel ayrıştırıcı özellik, devlet-özel sektörün ekonomideki görev ve fonksiyonlarıdır. Ülkelerin iktisadi tarihi analiz edildiğinde, farklı zaman ve dönemlerde bu iki ekonomik sistem arasında gitgellerin yaşandığı görülebilmektedir. Dolayısıyla iktisadi sistemler üzerinde bir yandan ülke koşulları, diğer yandan dışsal bir unsur olarak dünya ekonomisinde yaşanan dönüşümler etkili olmaktadır...
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The concept of causality, developed by Wiener (1956) and Granger (1996), has been a cornerstone for examining the dynamic relationships between time series. Since the Granger causality relationship helps researchers to formulate a suitable model and obtain better predictions for the variables, it has attracted attention in the literature and the Granger causality test has been employed in many studies. In this study, current methods used in Granger causality tests are included. In this context, in the relevant sections, the regime-dependent causality test proposed by Krolzig (1996), the lag-augmented VAR-based causality test developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1996), the causality test in variance proposed by Hong (2001), the frequency domain test developed by Breitung and Candelon (2006), the asymmetric causality test developed by Hatemi-J (2012), and Fourier Granger causality test proposed by Enders and Jones (2016) are discussed theoretically and empirically. We would like to thank all the chapter authors who contributed to the book.
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The day everything changed, a critical moment, a turning point in history - this is how many commentators have described the 24th of February 2022. The day of the massive Russian invasion of Ukraine became not only the nominal date of the beginning of a full-scale war but also symbolic of a fundamental change in the international order comparable to 1 September 1939, 9 November 1989, or 11 September 2001. But is it really the case that nothing will be the same in international relations after 24 February 2022? For many non-Europeans, the Russian-Ukrainian war remains a regional one, with limited consequences for other parts of the world. Some may add that these regions have also suffered from equally disastrous, if not more deadly conflicts in recent years. The Russian diplomats often point out that Moscow’s relations with some countries have not deteriorated as compared to the pre-war period, and are actually deepening and intensifying. To further complicate matters, some experts view the events of 24 February 2022 not as a singular turning point in history, but rather as the next stage of a war waged by Russia against Ukraine, or against the West, that had begun much earlier. It may also be possible to see this particular day as merely an element of a global polycrisis, a series of political, economic, health, humanitarian, climate, and social crises that are overlapping and mutually amplifying their negative impacts. This collection of short analyses from experts with the Polish Institute of International Affairs attempts to answer questions about the scope, nature, and significance of the changes in the international system that were triggered or amplified by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Central to this approach is the distinction between the reaction of states and international organisations to the war and a change, understood as a profound and difficultto-reverse transformation of the conceptual framework of conducting policy, resulting in a significant and implemented (as opposed to announced) modification of foreign, security, economic or domestic policy. Documenting this change is the focus of the authors of this report. In some cases, the change was radical and almost revolutionary. Examples include the upending of the pre-February 2022 model of the European Union’s relationship with Russia in the energy sphere, as well as the decision by Sweden and Finland to join NATO. In most situations, however, the response to the latest Russian aggression fell within previously observed policy trends or plans, but with a significant acceleration and deepening. The rise of the Global South’s self-identification, China’s international self-positioning in opposition to the “collective West”, or the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance towards a forward defence posture can be seen as falling into this category. Similarly, it was not altogether surprising that Russia’s aggression has brought Ukraine and its European partners closer together, following on Kyiv’s stated political goal. In this case, it is tragic that this change was accelerated by the brutal Russian aggression. The war has also fundamentally changed Russia and its place in the international system. The process is far from finished. So far, neither the predictions that full international isolation of Russia would be possible, nor Vladimir Putin’s hope that victory over Ukraine would place Russia among the great powers co-shaping the global order in the 21st century, have come true. The authors’ adoption of this approach to and definition of change in international relations explains the special place of the United States in this review. Although the U.S. plays a key role in supporting Ukraine and mobilising the West, its response represents a continuation of the foreign and security policy strategy adopted before 24 February 2022, rather than a reshaping of it. Another challenge was the question of the permanence or irreversibility of decisions and processes initiated after 24 February 2022. Given the possibility of domestic changes (e.g., following elections in democratic states, but also changes in the power elite in Russia) or another radical transformation in international relations (e.g., following the use of nuclear weapons by Russia or North Korea), it is difficult to consider any process as fully irreversible. However, the authors of the individual chapters present arguments that, in each case, a political or structural critical mass has been exceeded, making the identified changes difficult to reverse. It is precisely our doubts about the sustainability and irreversibility of the German Zeitenwende that justify omitting it from this review. In the sphere of declarations, this is certainly a revolutionary change in German politics, but one year since the announcement, it remains only partially implemented and still appears to be controversial for significant parts of German public opinion and the political class. We hope that the analyses and projections contained in this collection of essays will provide a starting point for discussion and polemics. The ongoing war is likely to cause further changes and transformations in the international system. The contours of the “new world” that is emerging from the darkness of war are not entirely new, or completely unfamiliar. The 24th of February 2022 became not only a tragic date in Ukrainian and world history but also the beginning of a significant change in international relations. A better understanding of its nature can help us shape optimal strategies for states and international organisations to operate in the new circumstances.
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This collection presents some of the topics discussed during the annual meeting of Association of Professors in Economics and Management in Industry (APEMI), covering important areas such as: the development of the 21st-century economy, pandemic consequences and post-pandemic business policies, the development of digital tools, innovations and investments, and human resources in business.
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On 2.2.2023 the 2nd International Conference “Management, Technology and Sport” was held at the Faculty of Sports Studies of Masaryk University in Brno in cooperation with the Czech Management Association. The conference was opened by the Minister of Science, Research and Innovation Mgr. Helena Langšádlová and the President of the Czech Management Association Ing. Olga Girstlová, Ph.D. Innovative contributions at the conference covered a wide range of management issues (organization of a major sporting event and the impact of covid on spectator attendance), economics (aspects of budgeting of sports teams taking into account the crisis situation or the economic concept of willingness to pay in the sporting environment), technology (relationships between communication, technology and management models, e-sport). The next III International Conference “Management, Technology and Sport” will take place on 2. 2. 2024 in cooperation with American, German and Israeli universities.
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