TRANSPORT LINKAGES BETWEEN ALBANIA AND SERBIA (Policy Brief 2016/03)
Author(s): Sokol Lleshi / Language(s): English
Keywords: Western Balkans; European Union; South East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO)
Being for quite a long time on the periphery of empires and characterized as a backward region, what is now termed as Western Balkans, manifests existing drawbacks in terms of connectivity with the broader European network of routes, railways, and ports.Despite various differences in terms of infrastructure development and investment, most of the Western Balkan region lags behind compared to other regions or countries in the European Union. Nonetheless,there exist concrete efforts and organizations that encompass projects, policies and initiatives to ameliorate the infrastructural conditions in Western Balkans and enhance the transport cooperation and interdependence among countries within the region and their links with broader transport networks in European Union.
Since the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, which constituted a land mark event in showing the commitment of the EU towards the European integration of the Western Balkans,high level initiatives such as the Berlin Process have emphasized a new pathway towards EU accession for the countries of the Western Balkans. The context of the so-called enlargement fatigue and the shift from the regalia principle to a more encompassing policy of connectivity and regional cooperation has provided a novel path of development and a different opportunity for the Western Balkan countries. On the other hand, this particular region has experienced political instability, ethnic conflict and tumultuous transitions to democracy and market economy.In this respect, an improvement in intra-regional cooperation by furthering the ‘Connectivity Agenda’of the EU and fulfilling the SEE 2020 strategy increases the chances of congruence between the regional market and democratic institutions of the Western Balkans with the EU market and institutions.
Keywords: Western Balkans; Economic Cooperation; Integration Process
The economic dimension of regional cooperation is a key pillar for achieving an interconnected and developed Western Balkan region. Due to the prolonged economic transition, the high unemployment, especially among the youngsters, and the consideration of WB6 countries as non-functioning market economies, the economic cooperation and integration pillar has in fact topped the agenda of the ‘Berlin Process’ and has consequently received the largest allocation of funds, when compared with the other two –diplomatic and soft- pillars.
Lebanon – Resilient, For Now. EU Action Needed as Refugee Crisis Stokes Tensions
Author(s): Jan Daniel / Language(s): English
Keywords: Refugee Crisis;
While the destructive effects of the Syrian civil war have been felt across the Middle East – and beyond – the impact on Lebanon has been exceptionally severe. The scale of the refugee influx raises serious humanitarian concerns but also has the potential to undermine the long-term stability of Lebanon itself. The number of Syrians registered with UNHCR in the country has stabilised at around 1.1 million in recent months, amounting to nearly a quarter of the native population of Lebanon (4.8 million) although NGOs estimate that the actual number could be hundreds of thousands higher. Lebanon has coped remarkably well with the refugee population up to now, but in the longer-term, external assistance is needed. This creates an opportunity for the EU to act in the humanitarian interests of the refugees, the stability of the region and, in so doing, to re-boot the southern dimension of its troubled Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
The Risks of (Anti-)Muslim Radicalism - Charlie Hebdo, Islamic Minorities and Political Violence in Central Europe
Author(s): Jan Daniel / Language(s): English
Keywords: muslims; islam; radicalism; minorities; Charlie Hebdo;
Although the number of victims was low when compared to the attacks in Madrid in 2004 or in Utøya in 2011, the Paris attacks of January 7th – 9th 2015 had a tremendous symbolic impact that reached far beyond France. The Charlie Hebdo shootings and subsequent hostage crisis have renewed debates about the jihadi threat to Europe and how to fight it, but also about the position of Muslim minorities in Western societies and the relation of tolerance and freedom of speech. While most French and European politicians have been remarkably united and restrained and have been careful to blame the individuals in question rather than the Muslim community as a whole, anti-Muslim and anti-immigration parties and movements (e.g. FN in France and PEGIDA in Germany) have been quick to try and make political capital out of the attacks. Neither Muslim communities, nor anti-Islamic movements are as strong in Central Europe (CE)1 as in Western Europe (WE) and the responses of politicians and populations generally reflect this. However, focusing on security and failing to address potential divides between Muslim and non-Muslim communities politically, could have an inflammatory effect, which would make no one safer.
Two weeks after Syriza's ascent to power, fears of another Eurozone debt spiral are echoed by concerns over implications for European security. Syriza's ties to Kremlin operatives and ideologues and the government's opposition to sanctions, have led Athens to be cast (ironically enough) as Vladimir Putin's Trojan horse in Europe. It did not help that Syriza chose the ‘Independent Greeks’ an overtly pro-Russian far-right grouping as its coalition partner. However, given the country's economic dislocation and urgent need for debt restructuring, Greece's Eurozone creditors will hold greater sway than Mr Putin over its security posture.
From Vicious to Virtuous: Transforming the Ukraine Crisis - The EU can create a lasting peace by sticking to its (lack of) guns
Author(s): Benjamin Tallis / Language(s): English
Keywords: Ukraine; war; EU; policy; peace;
Given the rising death toll in Eastern Ukraine, reports of a ceasefire deal in Minsk are a very welcome development. However, rather than merely halting the war, the EU, Ukraine and Russia need to create a lasting peace. Calls for the West to arm Ukraine – a misguided attempt to level the killing field – has overshadowed previous proposals from EU leaders to create a free trade area with Russia in the long-term. However, this is the approach that offers the greatest hope for a long-term solution that can transform the conflict, EU-Russia relations and even Russia itself. It would benefit all concerned – apart from the Putin regime – but it faces many obstacles, not least within the EU itself. The EU needs to assuage the concerns that some of its member states have about engaging with Russia and with the Putin regime. If this can be done, the EU can also begin to establish a foreign policy that adheres to its values and perhaps even begin to address its own internal crisis of confidence.
Gesture Politics and the Symbolism of Compulsory Military Conscription - The Lithuanian Government sends signals to Russia and to its own public
Author(s): Markéta Wittichová / Language(s): English
Keywords: gesture politics; compulsory military conscription; Lithuania; government; Russia;
Since the end of the Cold War it has been a general trend in Europe to phase out mandatory military conscription. Only thirteen European countries – including some NATO members – nowadays still retain compulsory national service. If agreed by the parliament, Lithuania, which ended mandatory army service in 2008, will soon reinstate army conscription and join the ‘European thirteen’. Starting this September, for a period of five years, 3 500 men ages 19 to 27 should be enlisted yearly to Lithuanian national service. The Lithuanian president and senior military personnel claim that this move stems from the need to counter Russia's aggressive posture in the Baltic region. While portrayed by the Lithuanian authorities as a matter of national security, re-introducing conscription can also be interpreted as a symbolic gesture directed at Lithuanian as well as Russian audiences.
Ukrainian Mobility: An Opportunity Not a Threat to the EU
Author(s): Benjamin Tallis / Language(s): English
Keywords: Ukraine; mobility; EU; threat;
On April 01, it was reported that a group of MEPs, spanning the spectrum of political groupings in the European Parliament, had written to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, recommending that the EU grant visa-free travel to Ukrainians. It can be hoped that this was not an April fool, as the proposal has the potential to transform the EUUkraine mobility regime from lose-lose to win-win. Visa liberalisation is one of the few concrete measures that the EU can take, which would be unambiguously positive for EU-Ukraine relations. Travelling more freely will help Ukrainians enact a key aspect of European belonging, allow them to see EU life for themselves and bring back and adapt the aspects that they like, without increasing risk or threat to the EU. Fears over increased threats from enhanced mobility are ill-founded and the EU should launch this policy at the forthcoming Eastern Partnership summit in Riga.
Keywords: UK; military policy; security; nuclear deterrent;
After lacklustre openings to the campaigns of the main parties, the British general election came to life last week with an ad hominem attack by Defence Secretary Michael Fallon on Labour leader Ed Miliband whom he claimed could not be trusted to renew Trident, the UK’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Fallon’s attack - that Miliband’s desperation for power would lead him to “stab Britain in the back” by forming a coalition with the anti-Trident Scottish National Party (SNP) - was widely condemned for its crassness, but it raised real issues that the next British government will need to address. These issues range from the cost and utility of replacing Trident to the morality of maintaining a nuclear deterrent in light of calls for disarmament, the effect of unilateral disarmament in an increasingly complex, multipolar world, and the efficacy of nuclear weapons in dealing with asymmetric threats. The nuclear issue is politically divisive in the UK, with different parties taking different views. However the parties – and the electorate – must also contend with the deeper questions they raise regarding the role that Britain wants to play in the world.
Libyan Civil War: Enabling Illicit Migration Flows, Threatening Libya’s Neighbors - Only by supporting a long-term political solution to the Libyan conflict can the EU address the migration crisis
It is no coincidence that the three boats that capsized in the Mediterranean in April 2015 causing deaths of hundreds of migrants all set sail from Libya. It is estimated that most of more than 36 000 people who tried to cross to Europe in 2015 embarked in Libya and used various routes across the central Mediterranean sea to Italy. Since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 Libya has suffered from growing instability, factionalism and, since July 2014, increasingly chaotic civil war. The recent conflict has pitted two loose alliances against each other: the first is the internationally recognized government based in Tobruk in the east of the country and backed by the Libyan Army and various militias; the second is the rival administration formed by pro-Islamist forces in the capital Tripoli, which relies on a diverse coalition of armed groups. The situation is further complicated by the presence of various local armed factions and militant jihadists allied either to Islamic State, or Ansar al-Sharia. The failed post-Gaddafi transition and ensuing civil war have crippled state institutions and fragmented political authority. Combined with porous borders, this situation has allowed flourishing people smuggling networks to operate with impunity and created problems for Libya’s neighbours.
Offshoring Security: Protecting Migrants and the Schengen Zone - Externalising asylum processing accompanied by enhanced search and rescue efforts and border protection would benefit all concerned.
Author(s): Markéta Wittichová,Benjamin Tallis / Language(s): English
On April 15 and April 20 crowded migrant boats heading from Libya to Europe sank in the Mediterranean resulting in the deaths of more than 1000 migrants. The death toll this year is now more than 1500, which according to the International Organization for Migration is “roughly 30 times higher than the equivalent figure from 2014, which was itself a record”. In the face of this humanitarian crisis, European leaders agreed on measures to be taken in order to deal with the influx of migrants crossing the Mediterranean. However, it has been claimed that these measures do not go far enough and there have been calls for the establishment of offshore processing centres to allow migrants to lodge asylum application without having to make the dangerous journey to EU member states by sea. Offshoring aspects of migration control could simultaneously protect both migrants and the integrity of the Schengen zone’s borders. However, it would need to be combined with longer-term actions to address the causes of the crisis, and carefully managed to ensure that the EU and Member states live up to their stated values and legal commitments – something that offshoring strategies elsewhere have failed to achieve.
EU Response to the Migration Crisis: Too Little, But Not Too Late - As it faces mounting criticism over its lacklustre response to the migration emergency in the Mediterranean, the EU needs a plan to address causes as well as symptoms of the crisis
Author(s): Benjamin Tallis / Language(s): English
Keywords: migration; crisis; Mediterranean; EU;
The causes of the migration crisis in the Mediterranean are multiple and complex. Rather than just attempting to alleviate its symptoms, the EU must address them to protect migrants, safeguard the Schengen zone and act as a force for good in the world. Large flows of refugees and economic migrants who are unable to enter the EU through regular routes seek the help of people smugglers to enter the EU. Smugglers have been able to operate with impunity in the wake of Libyan state collapse and operate dangerous routes and dangerous practices of travel. Incoherent EU policies on Schengen solidarity and refugee resettlement have lead to a muddled and ineffective response, which is informed by xenophobic discourse and is an insult to the EU’s history and values. Failure to establish offshore asylum-processing and inadequate Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts have compounded the situation. After a disappointing first response, the EU needs to formulate short, medium and long term plans to address the causes of the crisis.
Responding to Sousse: Tunisia Needs Sustainable Economic Development Not a Security Crackdown - It is time for the EU to support initiatives tackling the economic stagnation, unreformed security system and marginalization of peripheries that feed rad
While Tunisia was widely praised for the progress it has made since the 2011 revolution, two recent terrorist attacks have reminded the world of the challenges that the country faces. Both the attack in the Bardo museum on 18 March 2015 and the shooting in Sousse on 26 June 2015 were committed by young Tunisians with links to Libyan jihadist groups and targeted mainly foreign tourists. The Tunisian government, led by the secularist party Nidaa Tounes, has responded by cracking down on radical Islamist networks and adopting a new counter-terrorism law that has been criticised by human rights groups as granting too many unchecked powers to the authorities. The nascent Tunisian democracy thus has to navigate an increasingly difficult road marked by internal challenges in the form of economic and demographic pressures, militant Islamist opposition and stalling reforms. Instability in the whole North Africa and the Sahel only exacerbate internal issues. It will be very difficult for the Tunisian government to overcome all these challenges alone and it is time for the EU to help preserve the stability of the country.
NATO's Eastern Promises? - Demands for permanent deployment of NATO troops on the Alliance’s Eastern Flank risk divisions at a time when political unity is at a premium
Ahead of the June 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland and other new Member States are stepping up calls for the Alliance to expand its presence on their territories. The military logic is straight-forward: permanently stationed NATO troops would dispel any doubts about the credibility of NATO's Article 5, and decrease the likelihood of Russia's provocation or outright aggression. However, in the absence of a broad political agreement on such a sensitive move in the Alliance, the initiative could prove self-defeating, driving a wedge between Western and Eastern member states and undercutting NATO's fragile consensus on Russia.
European Re-Engagement in UN Peacekeeping? - The small and medium European states need to face the unexpected challenges to be effectively involved in UN peacekeeping missions
Author(s): Jan Daniel,Markéta Wittichová / Language(s): English
Keywords: UN; Europe; peacekeeping; challenges;
The pledges made by many European nations at the World Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015 and large number of European troops in United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) both mark an important trend – the return of the European NATO armies to UN peacekeeping. With a few exceptions (UNIFIL in Lebanon and smaller units in Cyprus and the Golan Heights) European troops have been largely absent from UN operations since the termination of the missions in the former Yugoslavia. The recent withdrawal from Afghanistan and developments in European southern neighborhood have again made UN missions an attractive option for European nations both for security and capacity reasons. The European nations have decided to strengthen their presence in the Sahel region, through EU missions (particularly training and assistance missions) but also by responding to UN calls for greater contributions. This trend has culminated in the significant contributions of small and medium sized European armies to MINUSMA, which represents an important learning process for both the UN and European nations as well as paving the way for future operations.
Rather than deploying ground forces on its Eastern flank, the Alliance needs to embrace more sophisticated deterrence measures to dissuade Russia from its disruptive activities. NATO can do this through increased emphasis on resilience, but it must ensure that it also engages with Russia. The Warsaw summit took place at a time when the Euro-Atlantic community faces diverse security challenges ranging from provocative military intimidation on its doorstep to hybrid warfare and cyber threats as well as instability in several of its neighbouring regions. The deteriorating security environment accompanied by social and political frictions across the transatlantic space led some policymakers (e.g., Polish President Andrzej Duda or Lithuania´s Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius) to put high hopes into the Summit. Although some expectations were fulfilled (e.g., permanent presence of NATO´s troops on Polish soil and in the Baltic), the result of the meeting is not as ground-breaking as could have been expected.
Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent deterioration in Russia's relations with the EU and NATO, nuclear deterrence returned to the forefront of debates on European security. NATO leaders are under pressure to re-open NATO's own nuclear deterrence posture. The communiqué adopted at the recent NATO summit in Warsaw pointed to Russia's "irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric", and explicitly affirmed the role of strategic nuclear forces in NATO's revamped policy of deterrence.
A European Response to Russian Intelligence Activity - Russian spies do not simply gather information, but seek directly to undermine European solidarity, and require a response to match
Intelligence is traditionally considered to be an additional source of data and insights to inform policy makers. However, in recent years it has become increasingly clear that Russia’s spies have adopted – encouraged by the Kremlin – a much more aggressive and active role akin to that assumed by intelligence agencies in time of war.
Zapad 2017: How should the West respond? - Russia’s next wargames do not mean war is coming
Author(s): Nicolò Fasola / Language(s): English
Keywords: West; East; foreign policy; international relations; security; war;
Russia has always conducted military drills more numerous and larger in scale than NATO’s. Zapad (“West” in Russian) is the exercise sequence that generates most concerns for NATO, not only because of its proximity but also because of memories linked with the huge 1981 iteration, the largest exercises the USSR had ever held, which showcased in all its might the power of its new operational manoeuvre groups. Zapad 2017 will be held in September and is perceived as a potential threat to the security of the region, especially by the Baltic Republics, not least because both the invasion of Georgia and that of Ukraine were preceded by major military exercises. Is the threat credible, and is the fear of an opportunistically expansionist Russia justified in this context?
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