Rortyjeva kritika fundacionalizma (ka filozofiji socijalnog senzibiliteta)
Rorty’s Critique of Foundationalism (Toward a Philosophy of Social Sensibility)

Summary/Abstract: In this text I consider some of the fundamental characteristics of Rorty’s neopragmatism, whence can be revealed Rorty’s criticism of all essentialisms that find their “common premises” in what Rorty calls metaphysics. By tending to provide more flexible and less ambitious philosophical projects Rorty suggests an alternative mode through which philosophy is able to correspond with science and other modes of human self-assertions in one multi disciplinary, interactive, dialogical and anti-exsclusivistic sense of meaning in order to achieve more effective and concrete orientation and a practical means of “coping with reality.” Finally, I tend to emphasize how the vocabulary of metaphysics and the metaphysical construction of reality is deconceptualizing itself, to refer to the fact that the naming of the vocabulary of metaphysics as a “dead metaphors” is at least a problematical one. Quite the opposite, this text aims to indicate an equal significance of all forms of “final vocabularies” in one incommensurable, non-hierarchical and multidimensionally structured world.

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