The estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency during the second Berlin Crisis
The estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency during the second Berlin Crisis

Summary/Abstract: After the Second World War, the city of Berlin, like Germany, was divided into four zones of occupation, with the Allied powers taking the west part of the city and the Soviets taking the eastern section. Located 177 kilometers from the border with West Germany and deep inside of East Germany, the western sector of Berlin became an island of capitalism and democracy within the communist German Democratic Republic. Holding an important strategic role, Berlin had been a constant source of tension in East-West relations during the Cold War. After the leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, tried to blockade the Western occupied sectors by closing off all the land routes into the city, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, started a new crisis over Berlin by forcing the West to transform West Berlin into a demilitarized „free city” and recognize the GDR. This paper examines the CIA’s view of the events during the Berlin Crisis that culminated with the building of the Wall, highlighting how the US intelligence agency analyzed Soviet behavior. The estimates of the CIA provided a new perspective on the Berlin question, the anticipation by the CIA of the possible tactics that the communist regime could carry out in Berlin offering new details about the West’s perception of the Soviets. The US intelligence agency was not only a secret service of a state whose role was to collect information but, moreover, it was an essential part of the US political apparatus at a time when a good knowledge of the opponent’s intentions could radically change future political decisions. anticipation by the CIA of the possible tactics that the communist regime could carry out in Berlin offering new details about the West’s perception of the Soviets. The US intelligence agency was not only a secret service of a state whose role was to collect information but, moreover, it was an essential part of the US political apparatus at a time when a good knowledge of the opponent’s intentions could radically change future political decisions.

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