Извънредното положение като конституционна диктатура и рисковете за правовата държава
The State of Emergency as a Constitutional Dictatorship and the Risks for the Rechtsstaat

Summary/Abstract: This article analyzes the problems arising from recently declared state of emergency regimes related to the coronavirus crisis. The institutional context is that of Western democratic states, while the paradigm employed is that of constitutional dictatorship. Arguments focus on the transformation of the constitutional system from that of normality (liberal democracy) to that of a specific type of crisis government (constitutional dictatorship) characterized by emergency legislation and measures, excessive centralization and concentration of powers, limiting basic rights and weakening constitutional checks and balances (political responsibility and judicial review). More specific risks to democracy and the rule of law are critically assessed in the Bulgarian context of dealing with the emergency – absence of detailed legislative framework and standards for limiting constitutional rights, violation of necessity and proportionality principles, inconsistency and unpredictability of legislation and emergency measures, intensified administrative and criminal law sanctions, prolongation of constitutional state of emergency disguised as sanitary emergency situation. While achievements remain insecure and unpredictable under state of emergency, risks and threats to freedom, democracy and the rule of law are ever present.

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