KIEDY PRAWO NIE SPEŁNIA FUNKCJI KOMUNIKACYJNEJ – KRYTYKA MONOLOGICZNYCH RELACJI SPOŁECZNYCH W ŚWIETLE DIALOGICZNEJ KONCEPCJI PRAWA
WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT PERFORM A COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION: A CRITIQUE OF MONOLOGICAL SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE DIALOGICAL CONCEPT OF LAW

Summary/Abstract: The article deals with the problem of monological social relations as related to the conception of law that does not meet the communication criterion. The analysis is based on the dialogical concept of law and, correspondingly, on Arendt’s notion of the Athenian polis, Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Habermas’s theory of communicative action, Honneth’s theory of recognition, Foucault’s critique of monological society, and Fuller’s morality of law. The most important thesis is that the ethical condition of law fulfilling the communicative function is the recognition of the dialogical subjectivity of a human being and its participation in the constitution of law.

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