Jaka konwergencja? Jaka korespondencja? Peirce’owska koncepcja prawdy
What Convergence? What Correspondence? Peirce’s Account on Truth
Author(s): Dominik JarczewskiSubject(s): Philosophy, History of Philosophy, 19th Century Philosophy
Published by: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Keywords: Peirce; truth; correspondence; convergence pragmatisme
Summary/Abstract: The article examines the relation between correspondence and convergence in Charles S. Peirce’s theory of truth. An analysis of the context in which the pragmatic concept of truth was introduced, as well as the logical structure of Peirce’s definition, support the claim that Peirce’s position should be understood as a reform of the classical concept of truth rather than its rejection. In particular, the question of the nominalist and realist interpretation of classical and non-classical accounts of truth is addressed, as well as a critique of the proposal to reconcile the actualist and counterfactual interpretation of the convergence condition for truth.
Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Issue Year: 69/2021
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 63-81
- Page Count: 19
- Language: English