(Ne)ograničeni uticaj Nemačke u Evrozoni: opstanak zajedničke valute iz ugla istorijskog institucionalizma
(Un)limited influence of Germany in Eurozone: survival of common currency from the perspective of historical institutionalism

Summary/Abstract: The author draws on the insights of the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, to assert that the German government is to a greater extent limited by its membership in the Eurozone, than it is usually pointed out in analysis of its dominance. Above mentioned, is particularly evident when taking into consideration the relations of the economically most powerful member of the European Union and increasingly powerful European Central Bank. During the formative phase of Economic and Monetary Union, Germany has facilitated inclusion of assumptions relating to widest range of independence of European Central Bank into the Founding Treaty. By doing so, it has overlooked the possibility, that at the crucial moment of economic crisis, the European Central Bank will use its autonomy to pursue what is in the best interest of Eurozone, contrary to the interests of strongest economy of the block. Purpose of the analysis of the selected anti-crisis measures is to draw attention towards ability of the institutional system that supports the common currency to adapt against external shocks, including the ways in which supranational technocratic institutions are broadening their competences. The end result, of the crisis driven multilayer process of institutional adjustment, is gradual, but insufficiently transparent, centralization of economic governance in the Eurozone.

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