Economic Model of Groundwater Damage Control in Semarang City: Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Economic Model of Groundwater Damage Control in Semarang City: Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Author(s): Bambang Siswanto, Franciscus Xaverius Sugiyanto, Akhmad Syakir KurniaSubject(s): Economy, Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Business Economy / Management
Published by: ASERS Publishing
Keywords: Semarang City; groundwater damage; prisoner's dilemma game; economic experiments; payoff matrix; framing; communication;
Summary/Abstract: Groundwater abstraction in Semarang City is thought to have triggered land subsidence and sea water intrusion. This research models the behavior of groundwater users through economic experiments using Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The experimental design is a 23 factorial design. The independent variables or factors are payoff, framing, and communication, while the response variable is the level of cooperation. The G statistic shows a significant logit equation model. Wald statistic shows a significant framing factor, whereas communication factor, framing and communication interaction factor, all factors interaction is significant but with the opposite sign. The study implies a policy based on the treatment proxy in experiments. First, narrating the depletion and the role of groundwater users is narrated. Second, building trust before implementing information disclosure on groundwater use. Third, determining groundwater extraction fines after internalizing scarcity rent in groundwater prices calculation.
Journal: Journal of Environmental Management and Tourism (JEMT)
- Issue Year: XII/2021
- Issue No: 7(55)
- Page Range: 1951-1960
- Page Count: 10
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF