The avoidance of essentialization of the imaginary in the Science of Logic Cover Image

EVITAREA ESENȚIALIZĂRII IMAGINARULUI ÎN ȘTIINȚA LOGICII
The avoidance of essentialization of the imaginary in the Science of Logic

Author(s): Victor Dogaru
Subject(s): Epistemology, Logic, 19th Century Philosophy, German Idealism
Published by: Editura Academiei Române
Keywords: speculative logic; reflection; metaphysics; idealism; realism; posthumanism; critical theory;

Summary/Abstract: In this article, I will explain the deadlock in which conflicting lectures of Hegel may obfuscate the German’s philosopher widely known relation of thought to being in his Science of Logic. On one hand, instead of presupposing some “infinite” richness or variety of Being itself (in the utmost ontological way of thinking it), which would be the “inexhaustible” or “unfathomable” character of Being that is created, nonetheless, through this act of presupposing alone, we must firstly explain what exactly is this concept of Being. All the declamations of the so-called immediate infinity of Being can be dismembered through the presuppositionless act of attentively highlighting every concept which can be suitable for Being. Hegel proved how all the concepts of Ontology are generated from his critique of Being and, thus, can be subsumed to this critique. The immediate character of Being became evanescent and fully incorporated into a mediated process. To the question of Being, Hegel gave a logical answer. But, on the other hand, Hegel’s Being is never empty, but goes from very simple formation of consciousness through sublations to the absolute one. The form is extremely different on every phase. So, even though the beginning is never Determination, but Pure Being and neither Being, nor Nothing is substantial, there is the bar that separates them which is substantial. The name for the „bar” that traverses Being and rots it from within is the subject. Being is „always-already” mediated by the subject and that stops the essentialization of the imaginary (or confusing semantics with ontology).

  • Issue Year: XIX/2021
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 139-154
  • Page Count: 16
  • Language: Romanian