Eleştirinin Eleştirisi: Bilgi Tanımı Bağlamında Hüsâm Çelebi’nin Hatibzâde Tenkidi
Critique of The Criticism: Ḥusām Çelebi’s Criticism of Khaṭībzāde in the Context of The Definition of Knowledge

Summary/Abstract: Since the early period of Islamic thought, studies on the subject of existence, knowledge, and value have been made by theologians. While some theology-philosophy books started with the subject of existence, some of them started with the subject of knowledge. It is known that knowledge is closely related to faith. Due to this close contact, theologians have built their philosophy of knowledge around titles such as the definition, limits, sources and possibilities of knowledge. Rather than discussing faith, which has a predominant subjective aspect, the field of knowledge, which is a more objective field, has been highlighted. Thanks to the transfer of faith to the knowledge field, people were able to conduct their discussions on rational grounds. It is foreseen that the issue will be inconclusive when faith is discussed alone. Every person is free to believe anything, regardless of right or wrong, but the same freedom does not exist in the field of knowledge. Knowledge has an objective and controllable structure. Therefore anyone who is trying to convey his or his/her belief to others should definitely explain his/her belief on a rational basis. Belief should be brought closer to knowledge in order to spread the sharing of faith. Belief cannot be examined, but knowledge cannot be ruled out. The close relationship of knowledge with belief should not be overlooked. On account of this for theologians faith and belief consist of affirmation. So what is knowledge, what does it mean to know? Is knowing the same as believing? Is the person who says he knows something different from the person who says he believes something? All these questions seem to necessitate the definition of knowledge as well as belief. The definition of knowledge changes according to schools and scholars in Islamic thought. Some scholars claim that absolute knowledge cannot be defined by counting its self-evident (badīhī). However, according to the great majority, knowledge is theoretical and therefore its definition can be made. In the history of kalām, many definitions of knowledge have been made and criticized. In the article, the definition of knowledge as “an adjective that obliges to differentiate” will be investigated. According to this definition, another important feature of knowledge is that differentiation is not likely to contradict. In the final analysis, the category of knowledge is an adjective. Through the agency of this adjective, the subject knows. Knowledge is a separate activity. For something known to be knowledge, it must be certain and not otherwise likely. An imprecise comprehension is not considered knowledge according to theologians. This kind of knowledge definition, which was presented perfectly in the theological books of the late period, was criticized by Khaṭībzāde (d. 901/1496) from ten aspects. Ḥusām Çelebi (d. 926/1520), on the other hand, found all ten criticisms of Khaṭībzāde weak in different aspects. Çelebi found all ten criticisms of Khaṭībzāde weak in different aspects. In the article, first Khaṭībzāde’s criticisms will be explained in order, then Çelebi’s counter-criticism will be examined and strengths and weaknesses in the statements of both will be pointed out.

• Details
• Contents