Теория на основателните решения: парадоксът на Але и логиката на действието
Reason-Based Decisions: The Allais Paradox and the Logic of Action
Author(s): Rosen LyutskanovSubject(s): Philosophy, Social Sciences, Psychology, Epistemology, Logic, Cognitive Psychology
Published by: Институт по философия и социология при БАН
Keywords: decision theory; Allais paradox; reasons; rationality; argumentation
Summary/Abstract: The present paper introduces a novel formalism for analysis of practical arguments, called reason-based decision theory. In (§1) I provide an analogy between logic and decision theory, motivated by the role that reasons play in both fields of inquiry. (§2) elaborates on the idea of reason-based choice proposed by Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993). In (§3) I illustrate how this idea can be applied to the analysis of the famous paradox of Allais. (§4) sketches the logical formalism of reason-based decision theory, while (§5) presents the different forms of practical argumentation. It is shown that they are sufficient for the solution of any dilemma. Finally, (§6) provides a game-theoretical semantics of the logical formalism and discusses the possibilities for its further elaboration.
Journal: Философски алтернативи
- Issue Year: XXXI/2022
- Issue No: 6
- Page Range: 117-129
- Page Count: 13
- Language: Bulgarian
- Content File-PDF