Dlaczego prawo naturalne neguje transhumanizm?
Why natural law negates transhumanism?

Summary/Abstract: At first, the article attempts to define what transhumanism is. To this end, two positions on this issue are recalled: one in its original meaning, defined by Julian Huxley in 1957, and the other articulated today by the most significant supporters of this doctrine (including Nick Bostrom). It is stressed that the latter is treated in today’s scientific and philosophical debates as a proper interpretation of transhumanism. This ideology has its own goal of creating the so-called posthuman, i.e. a new being so radically different from us that it will be difficult to perceive it as a human being (a representative of homo sapiens). It is emphasised whysuch a posthuman can be compared to Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Meanwhile, in its original version, transhumanism was concerned only with the improvement of human existence, i.e. quantitative change rather than breaking with human nature. On the other hand, his contemporary vision means the transformation of our nature and its rejection. Such a doctrine is based on the Platonic concept of man as a soul, for whom the attachment with the body is not essential. As further stressed, such a version of transhumanism faced strong criticism of prominent contemporary German thinkers: Jürgen Habermas, Robert Spaemann and Berthold Wald. In this regard, Wald‘s perspective in particular is presented in greater detail. It is also underscored, however, that quantitative transhumanism would also be subject to a negativemoral evaluation if the realisation of its projects brought about the violation of fundamental moral goods. Next, the article outlines the classical theory of natural law (Thomas Aquinas) as interpreted by R. Spaemann. Finally, it is indicated how dramatic – from the point of view of natural law – the consequences for human existence and society would be if the doctrine of transhumanism were attempted to be materialised. It was also noted that the realization of this ideology would call into question the perspective of preserving both our identity and the whole human race. On the one hand, the author refers to Spaemann’s classic vision of natural law in its elementary shape and tries to outline the content of the doctrine of transhumanism on hisown. On the other hand, he attempts to critically assess it from the perspective of natural law. Neither Spaemann nor the other two German thinkers, Habermas and Wald, developed this issue in this way.

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