О феноменологических истоках методологии истории А.С. Лаппо-Данилевского
ON THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL HORIZONS OF THE METHODOLOGY OF HISTORY OF A. S. LAPPO-DANILEVSKY

Summary/Abstract: The article problematizes the relatively recent tradition (initiated by O.M.Medushevskaya and picked up by a number of researchers) of a phenomenological interpretation of A.S.Lappo-Danilevskii’s historical and methodological work. The article aims to find out whether, and if so, in what sense (senses) it is possible to talk about the phenomenology of Lappo-Danilevskii. It shows the grounds on which this interpretation can, within certain limits, be accepted, and the moments of principal divergence between classical phenomenology and Lappo-Danilevskii’s methodology of history. The key point of these discrepancies is the phenomenological reduction, which is the essence of the phenomenological method, and, in the author’s opinion and contrary to the opinion of some researchers, is absent in the methodology of history of Lappo-Danilevskii. The theoretical positions that provoke the comparison of the views of Lappo-Danilevskii and Husserl are reduced to two main points: the problem of the psychological impenetrability of someone else’s Self and the understanding of the historical source as a construction of the historian. The article suggests that the “phenomenological motives” of Lappo-Danilevskii’s work are determined by the general philosophical and epistemological search of his time, perceived by Lappo-Danilevskii through the works of I.G.Droysen, Russian Neo-Kantianism and W.Dilthey, but hardly directly from Husserl’s philosophy, with which he could not be thoroughly familiar. The author suggests qualifying Lappo-Danilevskii’s methodological work as an original version of historical phenomenology, which was formed outside the direct influence of the classical phenomenology of Husserl. The article outlines the directions of further development of the problems laid down in Lappo-Danilevskii’s methodology of history, in particular, O.M.Medushevskaya’s “cognitive history,” A.L.Yurganov’s “historical phenomenology” and the sociological turn in the methodology of historical knowledge (turn from a subject to an actor) fixed by M.F.Rumyantseva. The latter, according to the author of the article, actualizes the key problem of the phenomenological tradition — that of intersubjectivity

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