Meno: Virtue as Φρόνησις
„Menonas“: dorybė kaip φρόνησις

Summary/Abstract: The article interprets the third part of Meno (86c-96c), which explores whether virtue is learnt. The pursuit of knowledge of virtue arises from the desire to gain it by knowing it. Predicting a hypothetical virtue in general from the perspective of Parmenidean being, it is also assumed that such an entity should belong to the domain of (true) knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Presuming that virtue in general belongs to the being it follows that it should also be an entity of the highest ontological order, and that knowing it would therefore simultaneously imply its practical acquisition. The problem of the cognitive status of virtue is solved by a form of hypothetical reasoning borrowed from geometry. Since one can only learn the things of knowledge, virtue could also be learnt if it belonged to the realm of (true) knowledge. Hence, if it turns out that it cannot be learnt, the assumption that virtue is a matter of (true) knowledge would have to be abandoned. To investigate the possibility of learning virtue in life itself, virtue is linked to the understanding (φρόνησις) gained from private experience. The examples of eminent historical figures who supposedly possessed understanding show that they failed to pass on the virtues of goodness and wisdom to their descendants. Menon’s presentation of Gorgias’ view that the Greek sophists taught only eloquence and not virtue leads to the conclusion that virtue is not teachable. This compromises the original premise of the study, that virtue is a matter of (true) knowledge and raises the question of the relation of virtue and the good to being.

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