Approbation and Disapprobation in Husserl’s Phenomenology: Navigating Value Conflicts through Justified Evaluations
Approbation and Disapprobation in Husserl’s Phenomenology: Navigating Value Conflicts through Justified Evaluations

Summary/Abstract: The analysis of the acts of approval (Billigung) represents one of Husserl’s first attempts to describe value estimation or appreciation (Wertschätzung). As some authors show (Melle, 2020; 2012; Ramírez, 2018; Montagová, 2012), the acts of approval play a prominent role in our experience because through them we are primarily confronted with the justification of our emotional and volitive acts. Yet, despite their importance, these acts seem to play no further role in Husserl’s later reflections on the evaluative experience. By relying on the recent publication of the manuscripts included in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, I offer a reconstruction of the Husserlian account of approval, situated between the emotional-volitive acts (Gemütsakte) and the intellective acts (Verstandesakte). In particular, I explore what problems Husserl faces in conceiving approval as a “secondary feeling” (sekundäres Gefühl) related to liking (Gefallen). I also propose that by examining the validity of our intentional acts, approbation and disapprobation not only reveal our evaluative position-takings but also constitute the affective ground upon which we can take sides in value conflicts. Indeed, by becoming aware of our evaluations we can endorse or reject emotions, desires, and wishes, and their related values on the basis of whether we take them right or wrong, justified, or unjustified.

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