MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN
MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN
Author(s): Jonathan HonigSubject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, Social Sciences, Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, History of Law, International Law, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Law and Transitional Justice, Political Theory, Political Sciences, Civil Society, Governance, Public Administration, Public Law, Government/Political systems, International relations/trade, Security and defense, Military policy, Welfare systems, Developing nations, Politics and law, Politics and religion, Politics and society, History and theory of political science, Comparative politics, Inter-Ethnic Relations, Philosophy of Law, Geopolitics, Politics of History/Memory, Politics and Identity, Peace and Conflict Studies, Asylum, Refugees, Migration as Policy-fields
Published by: Institute for Research and European Studies - Bitola
Keywords: Military Sanctions; Uzbekistan; Conflict; War On Terror; Foreign Policy
Summary/Abstract: States frequently find themselves disbursing or receiving military aid, cooperation, and access to military products. Using foreign policy options like "military sanctions" (the suspension of military projects, aid, cooperation, and access) is a desirable, widely publicized way for one state to express its discontent to another while presumably influencing desired policy changes in the client state. However, the small amount of evidence on military sanctions indicates that they are ineffective, short-lived, and may even be counterproductive. This analysis attempted to elucidate this subject by advancing a theory stating that states will impose military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures shortly after high-profile examples of undesirable behavior by client states. However, military sanctions will be eased as time progresses and public attention has waned. This analysis qualitatively examined Uzbekistan and its relationship with the US, finding support for this theory. It concluded that following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions would likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs. Further, military sanctions are eased or scrapped as time moves from public incidents and attention involving human rights abuses.
Journal: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Issue Year: 9/2023
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 189-203
- Page Count: 15
- Language: English
