„Ein Gegensatz principieller Art”. Betrachtungen zur rechtsdogmatischen Diskussion um die Möglichkeit subjektloser subjektiver Rechte
"A Contrast of a Principled Nature ". Reflections on the legal dogmatic discussion about the possibility of subjectless subjective rights

Summary/Abstract: Objective law had caught up with the legal subject again. There was nothing more to be seen of a free space for the person, an "area in which their will rules" - according to Savigny's definition in the system. Self-referentially based, positive law had officially begun its autonomous rule. It is precisely here that the "contrast of a principled nature" seems to be located, to which this study is concerned. It cannot be grasped in the traditional coordinate system of conceptual jurisprudence and interest jurisprudence. If one applies the usual method-historical standards, the result, based on Nocke, can only be: From conceptual jurisprudence (Jhering 1857) to conceptual jurisprudence (Jhering 1871). Evidence could be given for Jhering in 1889 using the example of the “compulsive concept”. But that would be another (dogmatic) story.

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