INSTRUMENTELLE RATIONALITÄT UND SKEPTIZISMUS. LÄSST SICH DIE HUME‘SCHE AUFFASSUNG DER PRAKTISCHEN RATIONALITÄT ALS SKEPTIZISMUS VERSTEHEN?
INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AND SKEPTICISM. CAN HUME'S CONCEPTION OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY BE UNDERSTOOD AS SKEPTICISM?

Summary/Abstract: This essay examines the question of whether the Humean view of instrumental rationality, i.e., rationality in the sense of acting optimally to achieve given goals, should be understood as skepticism. The analysis draws on two classic texts on the problem of practical rationality, namely K. Setiya's essay "Hume on Practical Reason" and J. Hampton's essay "Does Hume have an Instrumental Conception on Practical Reason?”. The text contains three parts. The first part is dedicated to some terminological distinctions regarding the question of skepticism and practical rationality. The second part outlines the arguments offered by the two authors in relation to the question posed in the title. The third part of the analysis points out the most important ideas that, in my opinion, make K. Setyia's argumentation more convincing than J. Hampton's.

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