COMPETITION-RESTRICTING PRICE AGREEMENTS. VARIETY OF RULINGS. CASE STUDIES: THE CEMENT CARTEL, THE YEAST CARTEL VERSUS THE SFINKS CASE Cover Image

CENOWE POROZUMIENIA OGRANICZAJĄCE KONKURENCJĘ. RÓŻNORODNOŚĆ ORZECZEŃ. CASE STUDIES: KARTEL CEMENTOWY, KARTEL DROŻDŻOWY VERSUS SPRAWA SFINKS
COMPETITION-RESTRICTING PRICE AGREEMENTS. VARIETY OF RULINGS. CASE STUDIES: THE CEMENT CARTEL, THE YEAST CARTEL VERSUS THE SFINKS CASE

Author(s): Monika Bychowska
Subject(s): Economy, Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Law on Economics, Financial Markets, Commercial Law
Published by: Menedżerska Akademia Nauk Stosowanych w Warszawie
Keywords: competition; price agreements; effectiveness of the authority; relativization of the ban on agreements;

Summary/Abstract: Forbidden price agreements are one of the most serious violations of competition law. However, even such agreements are subject to relativization in terms of their market effects. Those price agreements, which are evidently easier to detect, at the same time less degrade the relevant market. The task of each competition protection authority is to effectively enforce competition law, which means that it is obliged to deal with the most important cases that may - in the absence of the authority’s intervention - lead to irreversible effects on competition.

  • Issue Year: 39/2022
  • Issue No: 4
  • Page Range: 111-125
  • Page Count: 15
  • Language: Polish
Toggle Accessibility Mode