Imagination, Thought Experiments, and Personal Identity
Imagination, Thought Experiments, and Personal Identity
Author(s): Michael OmogeSubject(s): Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Psychology, Psychology of Self
Published by: KruZak
Keywords: Propositional imagination; cognitive architecture; personal identity; thought experiments;
Summary/Abstract: Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, i.e., considering the underlying psychology.
Journal: Croatian Journal of Philosophy
- Issue Year: XXIII/2023
- Issue No: 67
- Page Range: 69-88
- Page Count: 20
- Language: English