Zprávy německé rozvědky o Československu (14. září až 14. října 1938)
German Intelligence Service Reports about Czechoslovakia (14 September – 14 October 1938)

Summary/Abstract: Thus far, Czechoslovak historiography and military specialists were convinced that the Nazi intelligence service was familiar with the seat of the Czechoslovak Army headquarters at Račice Castle and its surrounding villages; however, it was not true. The closest estimate of the German secret service officers was that based on the extensive radio operation, the Czechoslovak Army was headquartered in the Morava River valley near Kroměříž. They had been ambivalent about it until the turn of September and October 1938 when the Czechoslovak Army staff returned to Prague. Unlike the persisting belief, the Germans were unclear about the precise deployment of the individual corps and divisions of the Czechoslovak Army. Neither the Nazi Abwehr, nor the Wehrmacht leaders had a clear idea about the structure of the individual corps and divisions, or the deployment of their staffs and subordinated troops, until the German soldiers were released from the Czechoslovak Army at the beginning of October 1938. Regarding the Czechoslovak Air Force, the German intelligence service officers were even convinced that it was comprised of seven air regiments, while there were actually only six. Until the demobilisation, the Nazi secret service officers had more precise information about areas with a majority of German inhabitants. Otherwise, they groped in the dark and even admitted they had no clue how the Czechoslovak Army could form so many reserve divisions and regiments. The estimate about the overall strength of the Czechoslovak Army was similar. For example, on 28 September 1938, the Abwehr officers estimated that 562 thousand soldiers were mobilised, while there were actually twice as many by 30 September 1938 – 1.28 million. Up until now, no research focused on the German radio intelligence service that acquired very precise information. However, its greatest contribution was that in May 1938 they confirmed within two and a half hours that the Czechoslovak Army announced a mobilisation. As testified by General Lieutenant Albert Praun, the last commander of the Wehrmacht intelligence service, they arrived at this conclusion based on the immediate renaming of Czechoslovak military broadcasting stations and changed frequencies. Although they could not determine the types of units behind the encrypted codes, Praun commented with contempt that during the mobilisation in September 1938 these procedures and broadcasting codes remained unchanged, and so the eavesdropping officers could confirm the mobilisation within just two minutes.

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