Уилям Окам за свободата, предопределението, предзнанието и бъдещи случайни събития и тяхната интерпретация при Вилхелм Готфрид Лайбниц
William Ockham on freedom, predestination, foreknowledge, and future contingent events and their interpretation in Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz

Summary/Abstract: This paper continues an earlier debate on whether “God can know more than He knows”. In the present text I offer further comments on some key concepts that were only scarcely addressed or left without additional clarification. It is an attempt to draw attention to the issue about the relation between God’s knowledge and future contingent events, as well as some key concepts from the philosophy of Ockham and Leibniz, such as: “future contingent events”, “freedom”, “created free will” etc. The relationship between predestination and free will is also addressed in Ockham’s treatise on divine foreknowledge, providence, and future contingent events (1322-1324). Ockham’s interest in the possibility for a principled logical solution to the theological problems of predestination and God‘s foreknowledge of future contingent events is also explored. I am briefly discussing how this theme affected the philosophical debate in the following centuries, particularly Leibniz’ views on freedom, free will, predestination, and divine foreknowledge. The reason why the issues raised by Ockham were still relevant in later times is rooted in the difficulty to address them adequately. Resolv￾ing these issues gets (or ‘returns’) us back to a fascinating medieval debate, which Leibniz inherited and sustained with his comments.

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