Banality of evil in perspective of Hannah Arendt
Banality of evil in perspective of Hannah Arendt
Author(s): Barbora Wernerová, Helena LustováSubject(s): Psychology, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Criminology, Fascism, Nazism and WW II
Published by: Vysoká škola evropských a regionálních studií, z. ú.
Keywords: evil; banality of evil; Hannah Arendt; responsibility; Adolf Eichmann;
Summary/Abstract: This article deals with the philosophical outcomes of the concept of the banality of evil in the perspective of Hannah Arendt. Arendt had been dealing with the question of evil even before her presence at the trial with Adolf Eichmann. During the process Arendt was greatly affected by the defendant’s ordinary personality, who, like so many other Nazi criminals, based his defence on the fact of mere execution of commands. Above all, Arendt focused on Eichmann’s clerical nature, manifested in a learned, declamatory language, and in a lack of awareness of the absence of his own responsibility. Eichmann considered his actions as an expression of devotion and did not think about the effects of his deeds. Arendt connects this thoughtlessness with the banality of evil. Thoughtlessness, along with the absence of awareness and responsibility, creates the simplicity of evil that we can see even today. Despite the many criticisms of the theory of banality of evil, we can see that Arendt was ahead of her time. She drew attention to the dangers of excessive obedience to authority and the persistent threat of totalitarian regimes based on ideologies. The aim of this paper is to introduce the philosophical basis of the banality of evil, especially from the perspective of Hannah Arendt.
Journal: Auspicia
- Issue Year: 2019
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 45-57
- Page Count: 13
- Language: English