CORAZZA AND KORTA’S MISTAKEN VIEW ON FREGE’S SUBJECT MATTER Cover Image

CORAZZA AND KORTA’S MISTAKEN VIEW ON FREGE’S SUBJECT MATTER
CORAZZA AND KORTA’S MISTAKEN VIEW ON FREGE’S SUBJECT MATTER

Author(s): Miroslava Trajkovski
Subject(s): Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: subject matter; judgment stroke; identity statements

Summary/Abstract: In the paper I argue against content pluralism as a solution of one specific problem Corazza and Korta deal with in their joint paper “Frege on subject matter and identity statements” (Analysis, 2015). Corazza and Korta test the idea of content plurality by its capacity to deal with Frege’s puzzle about identity statements but, I will claim, it doesn’t pass the test. In particular, I propose an understanding of subject matter in Frege as related to his judgment stroke. I distinguish two senses of “subject matter” in Corazza and Korta, and argue that their solution of Frege’s puzzle is inconsistent.

  • Issue Year: 66/2023
  • Issue No: 4
  • Page Range: 5-13
  • Page Count: 9
  • Language: English
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