CORAZZA AND KORTA’S MISTAKEN VIEW ON FREGE’S SUBJECT MATTER
CORAZZA AND KORTA’S MISTAKEN VIEW ON FREGE’S SUBJECT MATTER

Summary/Abstract: In the paper I argue against content pluralism as a solution of one specific problem Corazza and Korta deal with in their joint paper “Frege on subject matter and identity statements” (Analysis, 2015). Corazza and Korta test the idea of content plurality by its capacity to deal with Frege’s puzzle about identity statements but, I will claim, it doesn’t pass the test. In particular, I propose an understanding of subject matter in Frege as related to his judgment stroke. I distinguish two senses of “subject matter” in Corazza and Korta, and argue that their solution of Frege’s puzzle is inconsistent.

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