Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure
Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure
Author(s): Marco Dall’Aglio, Federica Briata, Vito FragnelliSubject(s): Economy
Published by: Univerzita Karlova v Praze - Institut ekonomických studií
Keywords: Fairness; Knaster’s procedure; complete risk aversion; dynamic coalition formation
Summary/Abstract: In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
Journal: Czech Economic Review
- Issue Year: 6/2012
- Issue No: 03
- Page Range: 199-208
- Page Count: 10
- Language: English
