HUSERLOVA RANA EGOLOGIJA
HUSSERL’S EARLY EGOLOGY
Author(s): Andrija JurićSubject(s): Epistemology, Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Phenomenology
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: pure I; phenomenological I; stream of consciousness; unity of consciousness; phenomenology;
Summary/Abstract: Phenomenological egology presents a fruitful area for examining the concept of the I (ego) and its relation with consciousness. It is possible to distinguish as many as four stages in the development of Husserl’s egological views. Logical Investigations [1900/1] represents a prominently nonegological, Humean position, which is reflected in the denial of the pure I in the phenomenological stream of consciousness, and which is formulated in relation to the neo-Kantians. The unity of consciousness is based on the phenomenological I understood as the „core” of the empirical I, for which the latter appears as the phenomenal I. The shortcomings of such an attitude, some of which Husserl himself will point out, will motivate the transition to the egological position in Ideas [1913], which will mark the entire further development of his phenomenology. The explication of these shortcomings is of wider significance for the discussion between egological and nonegological theories of consciousness.
Journal: Theoria
- Issue Year: 65/2022
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 51-64
- Page Count: 14
- Language: Serbian