REALISTIČKA I ANTIREALISTIČKA INTERPRETACIJA VITGENŠTAJNOVE RASPRAVE O SLEĐENJU PRAVILA
REALIST AND ANTIREALIST INTERPRETATIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN’S RULE-FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS

Summary/Abstract: The sceptical paradox which Kripke found in Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations threatens the very notion of meaning. However, Kripke also offered a sceptical solution to it, according to which semantic sentences have no truth conditions, but their meaning is determined by assertability conditions instead. He presented Wittgenstein’s development as the abandoning of semantic realism of the Tractatus in favour of semantic antirealism, characteristic of Philosophical Investigations. Crispin Wright, although at points critical of Kripke’s interpretation, also understood the rule-following considerations as containing a crucial argument for antirealism. Contrary to Wright, John McDowell maintained that they offer a transcendental argument for realism. In this paper, I will argue that neither the realist nor the antirealist reading is faithfull to Wittgenstein, as his important conceptual distinction between criteria and symptoms is not adequately recoverable in any of them. Hence the upshot of rulefollowing considerations is that the distinction between realism and antirealism should not be articulated in terms of truth/assertability conditions.

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