THE MANIPULATION ARGUMENT AND FRANKFURT-STYLE COMPATIBILISM Cover Image

ARGUMENT MANIPULACIJE I KOMPATIBILIZAM FRANKFURTOVSKOG TIPA
THE MANIPULATION ARGUMENT AND FRANKFURT-STYLE COMPATIBILISM

Author(s): Nedžib M. Prašević
Subject(s): Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Contemporary Philosophy
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: manipulation argument; Frankfurt-style compatibilism; moral responsibility; autonomy; hierarchical account; reason-responsive mechanism;

Summary/Abstract: In the metaphysics of free will, the most intense debate at this time is that between Frankfurt-style compatibilists and proponents of the manipulation argument centred around the appropriate answer to the question of whether a compatibilisticaly defined agents can be morally responsible if they are a victim of manipulation? In this paper, I aim to explain the reasons behind the dispute as well as bring attention to certain tacit assumptions that underpin the concept of the manipulation argument and that Frankfurt-style compatibilists need to reject. For this reason, my conclusions is that Frankfurt-style compatibilists must accept the counter-intuitive possibility that agents can have moral responsibility for their actions despite being a victim of manipulation.

  • Issue Year: 63/2020
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 57-73
  • Page Count: 19
  • Language: Serbian
Toggle Accessibility Mode