WILLIAMS’ CONTEXTUALISM AS A CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM Cover Image

VILIJAMSOV KONTEKSTUALIZAM KAO KRITIKA EPISTEMOLOŠKOG REALIZMA
WILLIAMS’ CONTEXTUALISM AS A CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

Author(s): Miloš Bogdanovic
Subject(s): Epistemology, Logic, Contemporary Philosophy
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: Contextualism; epistemological realism; skepticism; invariantism; methodological necessities;

Summary/Abstract: Although Williams’ contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests – epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams’ position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of scepticism as first and foremost a methodological necessity of epistemological realism, Williams succeeds in offering an enlightening diagnosis of the sceptical paradox problem which is at the centre of epistemology traditionally construed.

  • Issue Year: 62/2019
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 91-102
  • Page Count: 12
  • Language: Serbian
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