KINESKA SOBA I IDENTITET PROGRAMA
CHINESE ROOM AND PROGRAM IDENTITY

Summary/Abstract: The Chinese room argument is famous argument introduced by John Searle, in which Searle presented various problems with the claim that it is possible for the artificiall intelligence to have understanding of a language in a way in which intelligent beings such as humans have that capacity. The argument was influential enough to, in decades following it, sparke numerous responses and critiques, along with a few alleged improvments to it from Searle. In this article, I will analyze one atyipicall critique of Searle’s argument, made by Mark Sprevak. Sprevak, unlike the other critics of the argument, agrees with Searle that understanding does not exist in Chinese room in any way, but he claims that Chinese room cannot execute every possible program, like Searle claims. Because of that, Searle cannot conclude the strong conclusion he wants from The Chinese room argument. In this article, I will analyze Searle’s argument, I will give a brief overview of typical responses to it, and I will analyze Sprevak’s response. In the last section, I will present argument that shows that Sprevak, if he wants to keep his conclusions, must either give up one part of his response, or accept one of the typical responses to Searle’s argument, thus making his own response dependent on the response from others.

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