DA LI JE KRIPKENŠTAJN ZAISTA SKEPTIK U POGLEDU ZNAČENJA?
IS KRIPKENSTEIN REALLY A SKEPTIC ABOUT MEANING?
Author(s): Miloš ŠumonjaSubject(s): Epistemology, Contemporary Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Published by: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
Keywords: Saul Kripke; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Kripkenstein; meaning; skeptical paradox; skeptical solution; semantic realism; semantic anti-realism; truth conditions; assertability conditions;
Summary/Abstract: According to the standard interpretation of position about the meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein in his study Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripkenstein advocates skepticism about the meaning facts, and semantic antirealism – the view that sentences of semantic discourse have assertability conditions instead of truth conditions. The aim of this paper is to show that the standard interpretation of the skeptical solution is not accurate because the sceptical conclusion implies only that Kripkenstein doubts the existence of philosophical super-facts which uniquely determine the truth conditions that the speaker has in mind when he utters a certain sentence, but not the existence of facts about meaning altogether.
Journal: Theoria
- Issue Year: 59/2016
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 5-15
- Page Count: 11
- Language: Serbian
