Churchill, the “soft belly” of Europe and Romania (1941-1944) Cover Image

Churchill, le “ventre mou de l’Europe” et la Roumanie (1941-1944)
Churchill, the “soft belly” of Europe and Romania (1941-1944)

Author(s): Emanuel Constantin Antoche, Matei Cazacu
Subject(s): Political history, Social history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Published by: Arhivele Nationale ale Romaniei
Keywords: World War II; Romania; the Balkans; Winston Churchill; Ion Antonescu; Wilhelm Canaris; I. V. Stalin; F. D. Roosevelt; Anthony Cave Brown; Hans Graf von Holtzendorff;

Summary/Abstract: Attacking Germany and its allies through the “soft belly” of Europe by landing in South-Eastern Europe - Gallipoli, Trieste, Greece - was the great idea of Winston Churchill during WWI. Nevertheless, the idea was used in WWII by the creators of the Bodyguard project to make Hitler believe that the defence of the Balkans was a priority and send more troops in Greece and Yugoslavia thus depleting the Atlantic wall in France of its best soldiers. The book that first revealed all the hidden details of the Western Allies’ grand strategy was Anthony Cave Brown’s best-selling Bodyguard of Lies, New York, 1975. We also have the testimony of the German officer Hans Graf von Holtzendorff, son-in-law of Manfred von Killinger, who reveals that Marshall Ion Antonescu and the German minister in Romania wished since 1941 an American landing in the Balkans in order to advance to the Baltic and create an obstacle to the Russian offensive. The same testimony reveals that Killinger was a member of the military conspiracy against Hitler and declared he was ready to assassinate Hitler when the moment was ripe. On the other side, Bodyguard insisted on creating an armed opposition and foment troubles and sedition in the satellite countries in order to enforce the German military presence to the detriment of the armies guarding the French Atlantic coast thus facilitating the operation Overlord. The article depicts the modus operandi of the British in the case of Hungary which was finally occupied by the Germans in March 1944 (the plan Margarethe I). The authors demonstrate that the same scenario was prepared for Romania which had begun not so secret negotiations with the Allies, an activity that made Hitler prepare Margarethe II for the occupation of the country. Finally, the Fuhrer renounced at it because he had confidence in the capacity of Antonescu to continue the war against USSR, but also because of the massive presence of Soviet troops in North-Eastern Romania since March 1944. Nevertheless, the British agents worked on the same scenario and manner as their colleagues in Hungary (operation Autonomous), but they failed to provoke Hitler thanks, probably, also to the lenient and favourable reports on Romania Killinger used to send to Berlin.

  • Issue Year: XCIV/2017
  • Issue No: 1-2
  • Page Range: 132-154
  • Page Count: 23
  • Language: French