A Liberal Proposal to Justify State Authority
A Liberal Proposal to Justify State Authority

Summary/Abstract: In this article, I set out to design a plausible liberal theory of political obligation that a) revolves around the idea of voluntary consent, and b) explains why in certain instances, obligations toward political authorities may arise. To achieve this goal, I build upon and radically revise George Klosko’s theory of fair play, which is centered on the unavoidability of non-excludable goods. I argue that the theory of fair play suffers from a critical deficiency as it cannot withstand the libertarian charge first propounded by Robert Nozick. In particular, it cannot explain why certain nonexcludable goods should be held “presumptively beneficial,” regardless of actors’ preferences. I propose to abandon the notion of “presumptively beneficial” goods altogether. Instead, I contend that freedom (and the possibility of voluntary consent, for that matter) is severely curtailed in the hypothetical original position, in which individuals are supposed to pursue their economic activities; for this reason, the exchange of existentially necessary material goods cannot be based on consent. I underscore that such a conception of political obligation does not have an apodictic character. Moreover, it still suffers from several unresolved problems characteristic of general approaches to political obligation. However, it provides a promising starting point to develop a truly liberal justification for obeying modern state authority.

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