Pro-emocionalni konsenzus i kritika strateške racionalnosti emocija
Pro-emotional Consensus and the Critique of the Strategic Rationality of Emotion

Summary/Abstract: There is a growing pro-emotional consensus in contemporary literature on the relationship between emotions and practical rationality. Its proponents argue that emotions exhibit the properties of strategically rational states, i.e. that they can positively influence the cognitive mechanism of rational deliberation and lead an individual to choose an action based on its practical utility. In this paper, we will analyse the main claims of this consensus and examine their plausibility in light of three critical objections to the strategic rationality thesis. We will demonstrate that emotions, despite their tendency to trigger episodes of impulsivity and selfdeception, can rightly be described as strategically rational, with the caveat that proponents of the pro-emotional consensus must exercise caution when attempting to support their beliefs with the thesis of the modularity of emotions and the evolutionary explanations for their practical utility.

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