Pseudoscience Charges and the Demarcation Problem
Pseudoscience Charges and the Demarcation Problem

Summary/Abstract: Philosophers of science have long tried to identify some demarcation line capable of distinguishing science from pseudoscience. Nonetheless, no ultimate set of requirements has so far been achieved, leaving demarcation uncertain and fluctuating, if not merely rhetorical. The habit of using the word ‘science’ to address a specific kind of knowledge is a modern practice, with ‘science’ having gradually taken over terms like ‘natural philosophy’ and ‘natural history.’ Thereby, the term ‘pseudoscience’ is also a recent one, with its meaning running alongside scientific endeavors of the nineteenth century. The article contributes to the debate aiming to pragmatically describe the function of pseudoscience in epistemology. To account for this, we argue that questions like What is pseudoscience? or What makes science science? would be better replaced by the question What do people do with the word pseudoscience?

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