Má DMA regulatorní a/nebo soutěžní „DNA“?
Does the DMA have Regulatory and/or Competitive “DNA”?

Summary/Abstract: The European Commission’s „digital package“ includes the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which is fully enforced from March 2024. It is a ground-breaking pre-emptive regulation of the behaviour of operators of large digital platforms, based on automatic (per-se) casuistic rules depending on the Commission’s decision on the status of operators as gatekeepers. This ex-ante regulatory method is considered to be more timely and efficient for the functionality and fairness of digital markets compared to the previously applied ex-post control of the behaviour of large platform operators based on the enforcement of the prohibition of abuse of market dominance. The prevailing view is that competition law protection is late and inadequate on platforms already dominated by digital giants. However, the clear and precise rules contained in the DMA are paradoxically and ironically based on a reflection of the earlier European case law on the prohibition of abuse of dominance in competition law terms. While the DMA will bring increased transparency and legal certainty, it will also naturally create scope for circumvention of the exhaustive list of individual per se bans and commands, as opposed to the general standards of conduct under competition law. The article informs about the main principles of the regulation and comments on some of the legal and political tensions associated with it. It discusses the controversial possibility of double sanctioning under the DMA and competition law and critically evaluates the strict prohibition of self-preferencing of gatekeepers under the DMA. It discusses concerns about the chilling effect of universal regulation, which, in addition to eliminating the unfair practices of large digital platform operators, may stifle their innovative dynamism and thus competitive markets. The need for a sensible approach to this delicate regulation and for humble self-reflection is argued. Regulatory pressure from the Commission should be restrained and gradual in the search for the optimal regulatory position.

• Details
• Contents