A bűn mint a második etika alapja Søren Kierkegaard gondolkodásában
Kierkegaard on Sin as the Basis of Second Ethics

Summary/Abstract: If we want to grasp the concept of sin in Søren Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, we must first turn to the famous original sin analysis of the concept of anxiety, in which the psychological investigation of Vigilius Haufniensis attempts to describe the origin of the concept of sin, as it first comes into existence in man. However, the pseudonymous author does not reassure his reader on this issue, as we can learn from the introduction of the work that if we are to research the real possibility of sin, the best and perhaps the only method is the path of psychology. But in the sense that Haufniensis calls it the second philosophy and related to it the second ethics, which is meant to capture the reality of sin, this method is far from a satisfactory way to do so. For psychology, sin becomes evident only in its origin, i.e. if, in the mediation of anxiety, it reveals the contradiction of existence, which has freedom at its centre; however, it is unable to posit sin in the contradiction between the aesthetic and the ethical, which would open the way to the religious ideal. According to Haufniensis, psychology cannot be the method of the second ethics, this “new science”, but here we can only turn to dogmatics. The aim of my present paper is therefore to show how the concept of sin appears in Kierkegaard’s thinking as the main characteristic of this difference, but in close connection with this I would also like to point out the close relationship that exists between Kierkegaard’s specific theology of sin and Schelling’s Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom.

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