JEDAN SLUČAJ DISOCIJATIVNOG POREMEĆAJA IDENTITETA KAO ARGUMENT PROTIV FUNKCIONALISTIČKOG I REPREZENTACIONOG SHVATANJA BOLA
A CASE OF DISSOCIATIVE IDENTITY DISORDER AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FUNCTIONALIST AND REPRESENTATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF PAIN

Summary/Abstract: In the article “Differing reports of pain perception by different personalities in a patient with chronic pain and multiple personality disorder “ it was recounted that, in the single patient, some personalities feel pain that other personalities do not. In my paper I examine whether these findings can serve as an argument against the functionalist and representational understanding of pain. In order to provide an answer, I focus my research on the structure and appropriacy of medical methods used for pain measuring during this clinical study, as well as the official change of the diagnosis of multiple personality disorder, which happened after the publication of the forementioned article, with the aim of determining if this modification also changes the philosophical implications of the described medical case.

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