O różnicy między mocną a słabą wersją idei
wewnętrznego punktu widzenia
On the Difference Between a Strong and a Weak Version
of the Idea of an Internal Point of View
Author(s): Paweł JabłońskiSubject(s): Philosophy of Law, Sociology of Law
Published by: Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
Keywords: internal point of view; legal cognition; H.L.A. Hart;
Summary/Abstract: This article aims to theoretically emphasise the claim that the choice betweenframing the activity of courts in hard cases as „purely political” or „purely juridical” activityis a false choice. I achieve this goal in the following way. First, I introduce the notion of anepistemic account of the internal point of view, which is linked to the conditions of legalcognition. Then I propose a distinction between a strong and a weak account of the internalpoint of view thus understood. Such criteria as the autonomy of law, the relevance of thesubjective factor in the application of the law, or the disputability of the content of the lawplay a fundamental role here. Next, I provide a more detailed characterization of the strongview account of the internal point of view and of the weak one. I try to show that a sharp linebetween what is juridical and what is political is possible only when one adopts of a strongaccount of the internal point of view. At the same time, I provide reasons why such an accountof the internal point of view should be rejected. In the concluding section, I briefly summarizethe most important findings.
Journal: Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
- Issue Year: 41/2024
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 19-35
- Page Count: 17
- Language: Polish