A MOLDOVA’S FRAGILE SECURITY SITUATION
A MOLDOVA’S FRAGILE SECURITY SITUATION

Summary/Abstract: The Official relations between Moldova and NATO began in 1992 when Moldova joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. However, as Moldova’s neutrality is enshrined in its constitution, there are no official plans for Moldova to join the organization. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has upended not only the post-Cold War European security order but also the foundations of the European Union’s eastern Neighborhood Policy. The way forward for the EU will build on two significant policy shifts that happened in 2022. First, the decade-old red line of not extending enlargement further east was crossed. As a result, the future EU will be bigger and more Eastern European than before, which for some member states, such as France, is a historical turning point. Second, the separation between enlargement and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was overcome and the two will now be intertwined. Fourth, as Russia’s power and dominance in the post-Soviet region continue to diminish in the long run, the EU will need a Wider Eastern Neighborhood Policy that includes Central Asia. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. Moldova’s security and future are closely linked with the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is a decisive year for the country and its government with local elections approaching, in which manipulation by Kremlin proxies is expected, and an economy affected by the energy crisis and rising prices due to the war. In February a new prime minister and government were appointed – a move meant to address security concerns, hybrid threats, and energy dependence on Russia and Transnistria. The government seems prepared to address the threats, yet Moldova strongly depends on EU support. While the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria is often mentioned as the main potential source of destabilization, hybrid threats and the role of Kremlin proxies, such as Ilan Shor’s party, are much more of a threat to stability than the Tiraspol authorities.

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