О душе: платонизм множественности в контексте натурфилософии Марсилио Фичино
On Soul: Platonism of Multiplicity in the Context of Marsilio Ficino’s Philosophy of Nature

Summary/Abstract: The article is devoted to the consideration of the so-called Platonism of multiplicity in connection with the tendency in philosophy of recent decades to revaluate “non-modern” modes of existence, thinking and knowledge. The most important aspect of this revaluation is the rejection of Cartesian dualism (as a philosophical “symbol” of the modern era) in favor of anti-substantialist thought based on the conceptualization of the multiplicity of relations. Following this theoretical line, the authors identify key features of modern thinking and attempt to find an alternative to the modern (Cartesian/Kantian) concept of the subject in Platonic philosophy (in its Renaissance interpretation). For this purpose, the authors first of all clarify their approach to Platonism, construed not as a heritage of the metaphysical past, but as the very potentiality of philosophy itself. In support of this interpretation, various versions of the reactualization of Plato’s ideas in contemporary philosophy are given, associated with the names of J. Patočka, A. Badiou, and I. H. Grant. Following a brief consideration of their “Platonisms,” and clarifying the key concept for this article, “Platonism of multiplicity,” this concept is applied to the Renaissance Platonism of Marsilio Ficino in order to examine in detail the natural philosophical concept of the soul that he developed. Drawing on extensive research material, the authors describe the constitution of the soul as Ficino understood it, and demonstrate in what sense this concept, repressed by modernity, is an alternative to Cartesian and/or Kantian subjectivity, and explain why the task of current philosophical thought is to provide the conditions for its return.

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